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Emerging donors and rising powers in agriculture in ACP countries

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This Reader was prepared by

Isolina Boto, Manager, CTA Brussels Office
Lebo Mofolo, Jr. Programme Associate, CTA Brussels Office

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Isolina Boto, Manager, CTA Brussels Office
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1. Context: old and new powers

Important changes have been taking place in the development cooperation architecture as emerging donors have consolidated their programs in recent years. What had traditionally been a North-South relationship, clearly framed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of economically advanced countries, has now become much more diffuse. Although South-South development cooperation (SSDC) is not a new phenomenon or concept, it has gained prominence in a changing international order characterized by the economic and political strengthening of middle-income countries. Not only aid from Southern donors has been growing in the last decade, but also SSDC has come to represent a powerful set of developmental principles.[1]

In a context marked by disillusionment regarding traditional donors' capacity to reduce poverty, by fast Chinese expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa, and by Brazil's recent success in reducing its own poverty, cooperation with Brazil should sound a promising avenue. Indeed, Brazilian technical aid has higher emphasis in the agricultural sector if compared to traditional donors.
The main arguments are that most Southern donors do not have a colonialist past and do not impose political or macroeconomic conditionalities. Instead, they claim to hold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and to be in a better position to capture the social complexity of developing countries, due to their own recent experience with development.[2]

Africa has gone through a remarkable decade of economic transformation. Links with traditional partners face profound changes and relations continue to develop with emerging partners[3].
Trade between Africa and non-African developing countries grew from USD 283 billion in 2008, to USD 595 billion a year by 2012 [4] and developing countries' exports to Africa have increased in the last 15 years from 26 to 43 per cent, while their imports from Africa have grown from 33 to 50 per cent. [5] This year's *African Economic Outlook* considers Africa's surge in relations with "emerging partners", who now sit at the top tables of economic decision making alongside "traditional partners" from Europe and North America.

China takes centre stage, but other emerging partners together make up a larger share of many of the dealings. Africa's top five emerging partners are China, India and Brazil -- along with South Korea and Turkey. Europe and North America's trade share has quickly eroded, but they still account for more than half of Africa's trade and foreign investment stock, and their economic health remains key to Africa's growth performance. Prospects are good for the transfer of technology and access to finance. There is no evidence to suggest that the new players are hindering Africa's industrialisation, debt sustainability or governance, but Africa needs a clear engagement strategy and all sides must show greater transparency.

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[1] Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Geneva. From Rhetoric to Practice in South-South Development Cooperation: A case study of Brazilian interventions in the Nacala corridor development program. Isabela Nogueira. and Ossi Ollinaho. August 2013.

[2] Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Geneva. From Rhetoric to Practice in South-South Development Cooperation: A case study of Brazilian interventions in the Nacala corridor development program. Isabela Nogueira. and Ossi Ollinaho. August 2013.

[3] Defining Africa's "emerging partners" are economic partners of African countries which did not belong to the club of traditional "donors", the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), at the outset of the millennium.: (i) they are considered "emerging" economies in the global context; (ii) their economic relations with Africa have been marginal until the last decade but are rising fast and are expected to grow further. Africa Economic Outlook. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/theme/emerging-partners/

[4] UNCTAD. 2010. "Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership". Book Information UN Symbol: UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2010_en.pdf; African Capacity Building Foundation. 2014. Annual Report http://www.acbf-pact.org/sites/default/files/ACBF%20Annual%20Report%202014%20Eng.pdf

[5] UNECA "New forms of partnership" Issue Paper, Ninth African Development Forum Innovative Financing for Africa's Transformation 12 October 2014 to 16 October 2014, Marrakech http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/ADF/ADF9/adf_ix-issues_paper_4_-new_forms_of_partnership.pdf

To maximise development benefits from the new partnerships, African nations can draw lessons from their cooperation with traditional partners and the successful experience of the rising economic powers. Vision and ownership turn global opportunities into sustained and shared growth.

Figure 1 : South-South Cooperation in Africa



Source: *CTA Spore edition 170, June – July 2014*

2. Overall Trends in ODA flows

A closer examination of major ODA trends can facilitate a better understanding of the key issues affecting the existing global aid architecture.

After a protracted decline during the 1990s, funding for Official Development Assistance grew steadily over the last decade, with some contraction in 2011-2012, reaching a high of USD 134.7 billion in 2013,[6] although projections for 2015 forecast a downturn in ODA for some regions, notably Africa.[7]

Net ODA disbursements have consistently risen in real terms since the late 1990s, and reached USD 105 billion (at constant 2004 prices) in 2005, up from about USD 58 billion in 1997. Net ODA disbursements in 2005 can be decomposed as follows: 64 per cent for core development programs; 24 per cent for debt relief; 8 percent for emergency assistance; and 4 per cent for donors' administrative costs. Much of the recent increase in ODA has been due to debt relief, and to a lesser extent to emergency assistance and administrative costs of donors.[8]

2.1. Multilateral ODA

About 70 per cent of ODA flows have been provided through bilateral organizations and 30 percent through multilateral organizations. Among multilateral organizations, the role of International Development Association (IDA) as the main channel for multilateral ODA has been surpassed by the European Commission and the United Nations.

In DAC statistics, 'multilateral operational agencies' are international institutions with governmental membership which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies, and regional groupings (e.g. certain European Union and Arab agencies).

A contribution by a DAC Member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency.[9]

2.2. The roles of the main Multilateral Institutions

Regional Development Banks (RDBs)
There are three main Regional Development Banks that play key roles in promoting the development of countries in their regions. These banks — the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank — function similarly to the World Bank in that they provide highly concessional assistance to the poorest countries for both project financing and budget support[10], and include performance-based indicators in their allocation formulas. These creditors often

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[6] United Nations. 2015. "World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015" http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2015wesp_full_en.pdf

[7] AfDB, OECD, UNDP 2015. "African Economic Outlook:External Financial flows and tax revenues for Africa".http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/PDF_Chapters/02_Chapter2_AEO2015_EN.pdf

[8] IDA, Aid architecture, cit. For a more comprehensive evaluation of ODA flows in 2007 see OECD/DAC, Debt Relief is down: Other ODA rises slightly, April 2008, http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3343,en_2649_34485_40381960_1_1_1_1,00.html

[9] OECD website, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm

[10] Budget support is aid that is transferred directly to the partner country's national treasury.12 Generally, there are no restrictions on the end-use of the funds, or their sectoral allocation at the level of individual donors. Budget support is distinguished from sector support, in that the latter is disbursed to or for a particular sector or group of sectors, either through the national budget, or through a donor-controlled mechanism such as a basket fund. Thus World Bank and ADB adjustment credits (now development policy credits) count effectively as budget support. World Bank Poverty Reduction

depend on the policy work and programmes of the IMF and IDA to create the development framework and performance track records on which to base their country programmes. The RDBs work closely with the Bretton Woods Institutions to provide the co-financing needed to support the development goals and policy reform efforts of specific countries. Some of the key challenges that RDBs need to confront include the following: distinguishing themselves more clearly from the World Bank and developing their own areas of specialisation; identifying their comparatives advantage and becoming innovative risk takers rather than acting merely as cash machines; overcoming the sense among recipient governments that RDBs are too much trouble to deal with; and how to engage in Public-Private Partnerships (PPAs).

Figure 2: Growth in annual disbursements of selected regional and national development banks, 2000–2013



Source: *UN/DESA, based on annual reports from relevant organizations*
a 2005=100.

International Development Association (IDA)
IDA is the soft loan window of the World Bank, and it supports countries in their development efforts by promoting policies to secure the basis for economic growth and poverty reduction. IDA has a role as an instrument for structural and investment climate reform, alongside IMF programmes focusing on macroeconomic stability. IDA and IMF assist governments to establish a policy and fiduciary framework that is expected to promote the effective use of aid flows from other development partners. IDA is the world's largest source of concessional financial assistance for the poorest countries and invests in basic economic and human development projects. IDA's resources are provided in the form of zero-interest loans and some grants. Grants go mostly to poor post-conflict and debt-distressed countries.

The United Nations (UN) System
One of the UN's central mandates is the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. As much as 70 per cent of the work of the UN system is devoted to accomplishing this mandate. The UN has played a crucial role in building international consensus on action for development. The UN continues formulating new development objectives in such key areas as sustainable development, the advancement of women, human rights, environmental protection and good governance – along with programmes to make them a reality. The UN

Support Credits (PRSCs) are a special kind of budget support, in that it is specifically programmed to match the country's budget/MTEF cycle. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), The Emerging Aid Architecture, PRSs and the MDGs, 2006.
http://www.uneca.org/prsp/cairo/documents/Theme4_Aid%20Effectiveness.pdf

system works in a variety of ways to promote economic and social goals. The UN programmes and funds carry out the UN's economic and social mandate. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN's largest provider of grants for sustainable human development worldwide, is actively involved in attaining the Millennium Development Goals. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is the lead UN organization working for the long-term survival, protection and development of children, focusing on immunization, primary health care, nutrition and basic education. Many other UN programmes work for development, in partnership with governments and NGOs. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the world's largest international food aid organization for both emergency relief and development. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is the largest international provider of population assistance. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) works to encourage sound environmental practices everywhere, and the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) assists people living in health-threatening housing conditions.[11]

2.3. Bilateral ODA Trends: Mixed Progress on Aid Volumes

A growing number of public and private actors are boosting bilateral aid volumes. But the overall picture is mixed. Aggregate trends in volumes mask important differences across donor groups.

2.3.1 DAC Donors

Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all OECD Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) donor nations amounted to USD128 billion in 2010, which was an increase of 6 per cent in real terms (accounting for inflation and exchange rate movements) from USD 119.8 billion in 2009. While overall ODA remained steady, some countries did have large drops in their government foreign assistance. European countries going through economic turmoil decreased their aid flows. The biggest drop was seen in Greece, which decreased its aid from USD 607 million in 2009 to USD 508 million in 2010, a 15 per cent decline in real terms. Similarly, Italy, Ireland and Spain, which also faced significant economic challenges, decreased their aid packages by 5 per cent each. Other nations showing a decline in ODA were New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland. These drops were balanced out, however, by increased flows from 16 other DAC donors. In 2013, it was estimated that the DAC donors provided USD 29 billion in bilateral aid to Africa alone.

Table 1: Net ODA from major sources, by type, 1992–2013

Donor group or country	Growth rate of ODA (2012 prices and exchange rates)					ODA as a percentage of GNI	Total ODA (millions of dollars)	Percentage distribution of ODA by type, 2013			
								Bilateral	Multilateral		
	1992-2002	2002-2010	2011	2012	2013	2013	2013	Total	Total (United Nations & Other)	United Nations	Other
Total DAC countries	**-0.5**	**5.3**	**-1.9**	**-3.4**	**6.1**	**0.30**	**134833**	**69.3**	**30.7**	**5.4**	**25.3**
Total EU	**0.0**	**5.6**	**-2.8**	**-6.8**	**5.2**	**0.42**	**70724**	**59.3**	**40.7**	**5.8**	**34.9**
Austria	10.6	5.0	-14.1	5.7	0.7	0.28	1172	46.0	54.0	4.0	50.1
Belgium	1.6	6.4	-12.7	-12.5	-6.1	0.45	2281	57.7	42.3	5.4	36.9
Denmark	3.7	-0.8	-3.4	-3.0	3.8	0.85	2928	73.2	26.8	09.3	17.5
Finland	-4.2	8.2	-2.2	-1.3	3.5	0.55	1435	57.1	42.9	14.7	28.2
France	-3.7	5.3	-5.4	-1.4	-9.8	0.41	11376	59.6	40.4	3.9	36.5
Germany	-1.7	5.7	2.1	-2.1	3.0	0.38	14059	65.3	34.7	3.3	31.4
Greece	..	3.9	-21.1	-15.9	-7.7	0.13	305	31.7	68.3	4.6	63.7
Ireland	16.2	9.5	-3.4	-4.9	-1.9	0.45	822	66.2	33.8	11.1	22.7
Italy	-5.0	1.9	35.7	-32.7	13.4	0.16	3253	20.7	79.3	6.6	72.7
Luxembourg	15.1	5.4	-7.1	2.4	0.9	1.00	429	69.6	30.4	13.7	16.7

[11] Commonwealth Secretariat and La Francophonie Workshop, The Future of Aid: User Perspectives on Reform of the International Aid System, Background Paper. 2006, http://www.aideffectiveness.org/flash/pdf/background_paper.pdf
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/2012IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittances.pdf

Netherlands	2.5	1.9	-6.0	-7.0	-6.2	0.67	5435	66.4	33.6	11.0	22.6
Portugal	2.8	1.6	3.6	-11.0	-20.4	0.23	484	61.2	38.8	2.4	36.4
Spain	4.1	10.0	-33.2	-47.2	3.7	0.16	2199	35.2	64.8	4.7	60.0
Sweden	1.2	6.2	9.9	-3.3			5831			5	
United Kingdom	4.0	8.5	-0.2	-0.1	27.8	0.72	17881	59.9	40.1	3.9	36.2
Australia	0.9	6.0	11.4	8.8	-4.5	0.34	4851	86.0	14.0	3.0	11.1
Canada	-2.6	5.4	-2.6	2.9	-11.4	0.27	4911	72.1	27.9	6.4	21.5
Japan	-0.7	-2.3	-9.3	-1.1	36.6	0.23	11786	74.8	25.2	5.0	20.2
New Zealand	2.6	5.4	10.4	4.1	-1.9	0.26	457	76.7	23.3	10.3	13.0
Norway	1.4	4.4	-5.5	1.1	16.4	1.07	5581	77.3	22.7	11.3	11.4
Switzerland	0.5	4.6	12.4	5.7	3.4	0.47	3198	78.8	21.2	6.6	14.6
United States	-1.8	9.5	-0.1	-2.5	1.3	0.19	31545	83.9	16.1	3.5	12.6

Source**:** *UN/DESA, based on OECD/DAC online database, available from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics.*

2.3.2 Expanding Role of Non-DAC Donors

New players such as non-DAC bilaterals, private entities, and vertical funds are the fastest-growing sources of funds. Their increasing role is changing the aid landscape. New donors and modalities promise more resources and innovation for development.

2.3.2.a. Non-DAC bilateral donors

ODA provided by the 22 member countries of the OECD's DAC provides only a partial perspective on aid activities, as other countries have emerged as new donors over the past few years. Some (notably Brazil, China, India) were until recently themselves developing countries, which are now both donors and recipients of development assistance. It is difficult to quantify the volume, allocation, and composition of aid provided by most new donor countries, because their activities are not reported in a comprehensive manner. [12]

The number of non-DAC countries that now provide aid has risen steeply to nearly 30. That number includes emerging market countries such as Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, Thailand, Venezuela, and a number of oil-rich countries. These donors now provide significant resources, totalling perhaps USD 8 billion annually.[13]

ODA provided by non–DAC donors increased over the past few years, but it rose by less than ODA from DAC members. In 2002 ODA by non–DAC donors totalled USD 3.2 billion, an amount equal to 5.5 per cent of the ODA provided by DAC donors (5.9 per cent excluding debt relief). In 2005 non–DAC donors provided USD 4.2 billion, equal to just 4 per cent of the ODA provided by DAC donors (5 per cent excluding debt relief). United Nations estimates in 2011 were that SSC was estimated to be worth between USD 16.1 billion and 19.0 billion, marking a significant increase in the role of non-DAC donors in development assistance amongst each other.[14]

Non-DAC OECD countries are providing sizable amounts of aid and have plans to substantially scale up flows[15] ; they are even expected to double ODA by 2015.

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[12] World Bank, Global Development Finance Report - Chapter 2: Financial flows to developing countries: Recent trends and prospects. 2007.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2007/Resources/37630691179948748801/GDF07_completeFinal.pdf

[13] World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2008 – Chapter 3: Scaling Up Aid: Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Aid Architecture
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGLOMONREP2008/Resources/4737994-1207342962709/091-116_GMR08_ch03_web.pdf

[14] United Nations. 2015. *Cit.*

[15] For example, Korea, which provided $455 million in 2006, has plans to provide $1 billion of ODA by 2010

New EU member countries (not members of the OECD) could well reach ODA effort of 0.17 per cent of GNI by 2010 and 0.33 per cent by 2015. Middle Eastern countries provided USD 2.5 billion in assistance in 2006, with Saudi Arabia contributing USD 2.1 billion (as reported to the DAC).[16]
Firm data on assistance from other bilaterals are not available. Estimates place aid from China and India at about USD 3 billion annually, and both countries are developing larger aid programs.[17]
For example, China's "Africa Policy," introduced in January 2006, aims to support economic development in Africa—among other objectives—through a number of channels, including economic assistance and debt relief. The Chinese government provides concessionary loans and grants to developing countries directly and indirectly through concessional lending by the Export-Import Bank of China. The total amount of concessional loans and grants provided by China is not reported in a comprehensive manner and estimates vary considerably.[18]

Table 2 : Overview of "Emerging" providers

Country	Modality	Top recipients	Main sectors
Argentina	Mainly project oriented and technical cooperation. Some debt relief.	Mostly Latin America, (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Haiti). Extending to Africa (in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia).	Agriculture and food security, maternal and child health, human rights.
Brazil	Mainly technical cooperation and co-financed projects. Some debt relief and large amounts of emergency assistance.	Haiti, Cape Verde, East Timor. Other main focuses are Lusophone and Southern American countries.	Mainly social sectors. Some involvement in agriculture, bio-fuels/ethanol and digital inclusion.
Venezuela	Oil deals are essentially balance of payments support. Also some humanitarian assistance through BANDES.	Latin America and Caribbean.	Mainly energy. Also projects in health, education, housing, water, and private sector.
China	Bilateral aid. Projects, in-kind, technical cooperation, and debt relief.	Africa (46%), Asia (33%), Latin America (13%)	Economic infrastructure (61%); industry (16%); energy and resources (9%); Agriculture (4%)
India	Mostly project oriented and technical cooperation (with the exception of more general support to neighbors). Some debt relief.	Bhutan (36%), Afghanistan (25%), Nepal (13%). Approximately 85% to Asia; 15% to Africa.	Rural development, education, health, technical cooperation. Also gives loans primarily for infrastructure.
South Africa	Majority through multilaterals channels (esp. NEPAD, African Renaissance Fund). Some debt relief.	Southern African Development Community (70%) and other African countries.	Much work through peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, technical cooperation. Beginning to get involved with infrastructure.

Source: *CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness. 2014. "Issues on South-South Cooperation"*

[16] It is worth to note that 15 donor countries that are not member of the OECD DAC report their aid activities to DAC.
[17] World Bank, Global Monitoring Report. *Cit*.
[18] In an effort to cast more light on the activities of new donors, the World Bank, in collaboration with the OECD DAC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), conducted a survey of nine developing countries (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela). Only three countries (Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand) have responded to the survey so far. The information provided by these countries indicates that almost all of their development assistance is provided to countries within their region, largely in the form of technical assistance. Their development assistance is often leveraged with funds provided by industrial countries (so-called "triangular cooperation"), notably Japan. Source, WB Global Development Finance Report. *Cit*. Stahl, A.K. 2012. Trilateral development cooperation between the European Union, China and Africa: What prospects for South Africa?" August 2012 http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Discussion-Paper_AnnaStahl_FINAL.pdf

Snapshot: Brazilian ODA to Africa[19]

Brazil has also significantly expanded its aid programme (ABC, 2011; Saravia, 2012). Official volumes doubled from 2005 to 2010, when they reached $1 billion. This figure does, however, also include support to peacekeeping, which accounted for nearly 40% of this amount. Some 23% of this was disbursed to Africa. The volume of aid delivered to Africa through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) – a division of the Ministry of External Relations – has increased significantly, reaching $65 million in the period 2010-12. It has been disbursed to a range of projects in 37 African countries. The main focus is on Lusophone Africa, with a thematic concentration on health and agriculture. Transfer of knowledge and experience from Brazil through technical assistance is central to the programme. A key activity for the ABC is to mobilize technical expertise from institutions in Brazil for this purpose.

The case of China in Africa - ODA

Early indications on Chinese ODA to Africa were that in relative terms China was still a minor actor as compared to traditional donors like the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU). In fact, in 2009 the aid provided by China to Africa approximately matched that of Germany. In overall terms, the European Union – which refers to EU institutions and the 27 member states – remains Africa's largest donors, also compared to the USA. For instance, in 2009 EU institutions together with the three biggest member states in terms of ODA commitments (namely France, United Kingdom and Germany) contributed with USD 18,499 million in ODA, which corresponded to almost twice the budget provided by the USA in the same year.

A synthetic framework for assessing the impact of China on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) involves recognition of China's multifaceted influence: as a market for Africa's exports, donor, financer and investor, and contactor and builder. While official financial and technical assistance predominated in the past, commercial activities, which have increased rapidly in the last few years, are now dominant in financial terms.

As far as ODA is concerned, it is worth noting that China started providing aid to Africa in 1956. By May 2006, it had contributed a total of 44.4 billion yuan (USD 5.7 billion) to more than 800 aid projects, according to a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Science. More recent figures from FOCAC 2014 indicated that Africa received approximately half of the USD 15 billion of China's ODA during the period of 2010-12.[20]

The Chinese government officially reported flows for 2002 showed that China provided USD 1.8 billion in economic support to Africa. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics reports annual data on contracted projects in SSA countries, which include "projects financed by the Chinese government under its aid program." While the foreign aid component of the figures is hard to pin down, it is even more difficult to estimate the value of Chinese technical assistance and aid in-kind because of problems in pricing Chinese labour. Assuming Chinese aid, including technical assistance, is about 50 percent of the value of contracted projects, China's ODA to SSA could amount to USD 1.0–1.5 billion annually for 2004–05. By comparison, China's aid flows to Africa averaged about USD 310 million annually for 1989–1992.

The terms of China's ODA follow the principles established during late Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Africa in the early 1960s: no conditions or demand for privileges can be attached to ODA; China provides ODA in the form of grants, interest-free or low-interest loans (i.e., preferential loans that have an interest subsidy); and repayment will be rescheduled if necessary. China's aid program also includes technical assistance, with an emphasis on agricultural technology and training in Chinese institutions. [21]

[19] Tjønneland, E. N. 2015. "African development: what role do the rising powers play?" Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF). January 2015 Report

[20] Tjønneland, E. N. 2015. *Cit*.

[21] IMF. 2007. "What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa?" Working Paper WP/07/211, 2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012994

Table 3: Major types of aid projects by China in Africa[22]

Infrastructure projects	railways, roads, telecommunications facilities
Buildings	stadiums, palaces, government offices, schools
Factories	cotton or textiles, timber, oil, cigarettes
Agriculture	farming, tobacco, tea, sugar production

China and Africa: filling the knowledge gaps
There are significant knowledge-gaps on China's assistance and presence in Africa.
Key knowledge gaps need to be addressed, amongst which the following are most important:

The need for base-line studies to assess the changing future impact of China on SSA
- Analyses of the determinants of SSA competitiveness and the steps required to enhance productivity (for example, in clothing, textiles, footwear and furniture, as well as in export- oriented food crops)
- A more thorough assessment of indirect impacts of China's trade on SSA, facilitating the development of appropriate policies for providing special and differential treatment to low income SSA economies in global markets.
- Determining the impact of China on consumer welfare, income distribution and absolute poverty levels in SSA, through an analysis of the consumer benefits derived from cheaper imports, and the distributional implications of a switch in specialisation away from labour-intensive manufactures to capital intensive commodities.
- Distinguishing generic from sub-regional and country-specific impacts, aiding the classification of different types of SSA economies
- Identifying likely future areas of threat and opportunity
- Determining the drivers of China's strategic engagement with SSA and their impact on transparent and better governance on the continent
- Diffusing lessons from the successful experience in coping with the challenges posed by China, drawn both from within SSA and from other regions.[23]

2.3.2.b Private donors

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are providing a growing source of financial resources for developing countries. Governments' contributions to NGOs active in international development are already included in ODA tallies, but private contributions are not.
There are no reliable estimates of private giving to development causes but one recent estimate is around USD 49 billion per year, and possibly as high as USD 60 billion. The largest is the Gates Foundation with a total asset trust endowment of USD 36.4 billion and annual disbursements of USD 3-4 billion. But the fastest growing part of the sector are the numerous small foundations that are expanding in every part of the world. Similarly, there is no reliable estimate of the number or scale of civil society or faith based organisations that support development causes. They easily number into the millions of organisations. They vary in scale to those run by individuals to the modern international NGOs that are organised like multinational corporations with strong global centres and many national affiliates.
In 2010, private capital investment, philanthropy and remittances from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's 23 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members to countries in the developing world amounted to USD 575 billion, up from USD 455 billion in 2009. These combined flows of private capital, philanthropy and remittances were over four times larger than official flows in 2010. Over 80 per cent of all DAC donors' total economic engagement with the developing world is through private financial flows. Private capital flows remained the largest financial flow from all developed to developing countries and showed positive growth in 2010, reaching USD 329 billion, which was a substantial increase from USD 228 billion in 2009. Total remittances from all DAC donors to the

[22] African Studies Centre, Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?, ASC Working Paper 67/2006 http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/wp67.pdf
Shafik, N. 2011. "The Future of Development Finance." CGD Working Paper 250. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425068.
[23] DFID. 2006. "The impact of China in Sub Saharan Africa" http://www.uk.cn/uploadfiles/2006428172021581.doc

developing world were $190 billion, a 9 per cent increase from USD 174 billion in 2009. Total philanthropy from all donors was USD 56 billion in 2010, up from USD 53 billion in 2009.
Data limitations make it very difficult to assess the overall contribution of private philanthropic foundations to development. There are no comprehensive measures of disbursements made by private foundations to poor countries for development purposes. The procedures used to collect data on the activities of private foundations differ greatly over time and across countries, making comparisons problematic.
The more than 100,000 private foundations worldwide have a very diverse set of social, political, charitable, and religious objectives, which are often related to, but extend beyond, economic development. Most private foundations begin by focusing on domestic initiatives, extending their operations abroad once they develop sufficient financial and human resources and acquire the expertise needed by developing countries. Private U.S. foundations are believed to be the most active internationally, because they tend to have greater financial resources and deeper experience than foundations in other countries.
The data provided by U.S. foundations are more comprehensive than data from foundations in most other countries. They reveal that the number of private philanthropic foundations in the United States grew from 30,000 in 1993 to 68,000 in 2005 and 120,810 in 2010 mainly geared towards international initiatives, most of which was channelled through international organizations (such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria); NGOs; and private-public partnerships (such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization). U.S. private foundations provide relatively little development assistance directly to recipient countries, preferring to provide financial support to institutions with well-developed capabilities for delivering aid effectively in specific program areas.[24]

Partnership among private donors: the Alliance for a Green revolution in Africa (AGRA)
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (the Alliance, or AGRA) is a joint initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation committed to reducing hunger and poverty in Africa through agricultural development. Established in 2006 the Alliance is currently working with African governments, other donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and African farmers to improve the productivity and incomes of resource-poor farmers in Africa. It builds on and expands Rockefeller Foundation-initiated work in Africa.
The primary goal of the Alliance is to increase the productivity and profitability of small-scale farming using technological, policy and institutional innovations that are environmentally and economically sustainable. The Alliance seeks to develop a donor pool sufficient to provide the significant resources needed to revitalise African agriculture for small-scale farmers in the long-term. 27

Aid architecture and the private sector
Aid is related to the private sector in several dimensions:
- Private firms/actors are recipients of aid. They may receive subsidies or loans (including microcredits) for their investments and activities.
- Private firms are contractors in aid-funded projects. It is estimated that roughly half of ODA is spent on purchasing goods and services or contracting work from private firms for development projects.
- Private firms are implementers. Several donors channel an increasing share of ODA through challenge funds. Private firms bid and compete for the contract to implement the projects.
- Private firms are “partners”: Public-private partnerships have become increasingly important in development projects. Also in a financial sense, aid and the private sector increasingly partner through “blending” commercial loans with ODA grants.
- Private firms are increasingly important providers of aid-equivalent development finance. In particular large philanthropic foundations but also multinational corporations. Philanthropic foundations operate similarly to bilateral donors or INGOs, which is why this report will not deal with them.

The “turn to the private sector” is evidenced by the increasing use of the private sector arms of multilateral development banks. The International Financial Corporation, the World Banks private sector investment

[24] World Bank. Global Development Finance Report. *Cit*.
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/2012IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittances.pdf
The reality of Aid. The Reality of Aid 2012 Report Theme Statement: Aid and the Private Sector. http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/377/Aid-and-the-Private-Sector

arm has seen dramatic increases in the role it is playing in development as well as the size of its portfolio. Multilateral Development Banks have seen their lending to the private sector triple in size in the past ten years. Bilateral donor agencies are also setting up new institutions and facilities for cooperating with the private sector.

Ahead of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan (2011) a work stream was been set up by the OECD DAC to explore the interface between the role of the private sector and aid effectiveness. A new grouping of likeminded donors developed “a common agenda for development results” for Busan, which has a key focus on partnering with the private sector. Donors are increasing the resources for private sector engagement. They are increasingly using ODA to leverage private finance for investments. They have also increased their direct engagement with the for-profit private sector in aid processes. Such donor activities are officially motivated by leveraging the “value for money” they get for dwindling aid budgets by making better use of private sector expertise and resources. Key objectives are to change business practices to become more responsible and inclusive, to stimulate innovative business solutions for the MDGs and to improve “the business and investment climate” in partner countries. Key mechanisms for engaging with the business sector include Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), co-financing of pilot studies, blending loans and grants (creating subsidized loans that can then be cheaply lent) to catalyse private sector engagement. PPPs have in particular gained traction among donor agencies as a way of combining public and private competencies and resources.

3. The growing complexity of the global aid architecture

Aid architecture can be defined as the set of rules and institutions governing aid flows to developing countries. [25]

As noted above, proliferation of aid channels, ODA fragmentation and a significant degree of earmarking have contributed to increase the complexity of the global aid architecture.[26] Data analysis shows that there has been a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral agencies which interact with recipient countries. For instance, the average number of donors per country rose from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 in the 2001-2005 period.

In addition, there are currently over 230 international organizations, funds, and programs. Donor proliferation seems to be particularly pronounced in the health sector, where more than 100 major organizations are involved. This is accompanied by significant earmarking of aid resources for specific uses or for special-purpose organizations, including global programs or "vertical" funds. In fact, about half of the ODA channelled through multilateral channels in 2005 went through some degree of earmarking by sector or theme. "Verticalization" or earmarking of ODA has also been observed in some bilateral assistance programs. Available data for 2004 also indicates a large number of aid activities, which tend to be small in financial size.

The complexity of the aid architecture increases transaction costs for donors and recipients alike, which reduces the effectiveness of aid. Although the transaction costs of aid have not been systematically quantified, there is evidence that donor proliferation and aid fragmentation represent a tax on recipient countries' implementation capacity.

As mentioned above, non-DAC and "emerging" donors are becoming increasingly important as ODA providers. New donors bring with them more resources to help developing countries reach their MDGs. At the same time, new challenges for harmonization and alignment are created. Non-DAC donors are a heterogeneous group: the degree to which DAC approaches and norms as regards the provision aid finance are applied by non-DAC donors varies from country-to-country. Insufficient data on non-DAC ODA makes it difficult to accurately assess aid volumes and prospects from these sources. Non-DAC OECD countries alone are expected in aggregate to double their current ODA levels to over USD 2 billion by 2010.[27]

3.1 Proliferation of aid channels

Data analysis shows that there are a growing number of bilateral donors and international organizations, funds and programs over the last half century. The number of bilateral donors grew from 5-6 in the mid 1940s to at least 56 in 2006. There has also been a dramatic increase in the number of international organizations, funds and programs. Many of these new funds and programs are specialized in a particular sector or theme.

The impact of the proliferation of aid channels can be seen from the perspective of both donors and recipients.

The donor's viewpoint

Official bilateral donors channel resources through both bilateral and multilateral channels. This In 2005, about a third of ODA (32 percent) was channelled through multilateral channels, while the balance went directly to developing countries as described below. Over two thirds (70 percent) of the aid disbursed to multilateral channels was multilateral, while the balance (30 percent) was multi- bilateral, including trust funds. Multilateral channels can be distinguished between multi-purpose international organizations (that operate in several sectors and countries like the European Commission or IDA) and specialized or thematic international organizations (whose activities are focused on a particular theme or sector, like UNICEF or GFATM).

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[25] International Development Association (IDA) and World Bank. 2007. " Aid architecture: An overview of the main trends in official development assistance flows" http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/3492866-1172527584498/Aidarchitecture.pdf

[26] This Reader associates "proliferation" with the number of donor channels providing ODA to a given recipient country, and "fragmentation" with the number of donor-funded activities as well as their average value.

[27] IDA. 2007. *Cit*.

About half of the bilateral contributions channelled through multilateral channels in 2005 went through some degree of earmarking by sector or theme. This figure is an approximation based on 2005 annual reports. It includes not only trust funds and other multi-bilateral ODA, but also contributions to sector or thematically targeted multilateral organizations. Besides complicating budgetary management, earmarking may lead to a misalignment between donors' and recipient countries' priorities. By constraining recipients' flexibility in allocating resources, earmarking may contribute to underfunding of other investmentswhich are equally important for economic growth and poverty reduction.

The Recipients' Viewpoint

The growing importance of sector/thematic international organizations and private donors further increased the complexity of the aid architecture from the recipients' standpoint. The complexity of the various inter-linkages is also caused by a greater role for the private sector in aid funding and implementation. Private philanthropy in aid has grown in importance in recent years. In addition, competition among multilateral channels for a largely stable pool of resources has been combined with an increase in the role of private providers/managers of aid. About 6 percent of all reported official aid to developing countries has been provided through NGOs and public-private partnerships. The latter are a new phenomenon that emerged in the mid-1990s when global programs started to be deliberately set up outside the UN system.

Donor proliferation at the country level has continuously increased over time. The average number of donors per country nearly tripled over the last half century, rising from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 in the 2001-2005 period. The combination of more bilateral donors and of an increasing number of multilateral channels has led to an increasingly crowded aid scene. Aid channel proliferation at the country level has been substantial, particularly after the end of the Cold War when the number of countries with over 40 active donors and international organizations grew from zero to thirty-one. The number of international organizations, funds and programs is now higher than the number of developing countries they were created to assist.

Multiple aid channels impose an additional strain on already weak implementation capacities in low-income countries. In fact, "managing aid flows from many different donors is a huge challenge for recipient countries, since different donors usually insist on using their own unique processes for initiating, implementing, and monitoring projects. Recipients can be overwhelmed by requirements for multiple project audits, environmental assessments, procurement reports, financial statements, and project updates".

Proliferation of aid channels is particularly pronounced in the health sector. In fact, more than 100 major organizations are involved in the health sector, a much higher degree of proliferation than in any other sector. Insufficient clarity of mandates and roles for the various donor organizations – associated with the earmarking of much such aid – makes it difficult to reconcile with "the development of a holistic approach to health systems and sustainable financing at the country level".[28]

3.2 Fragmentation of ODA

The proliferation of aid channels has been combined with fragmented aid. ODA fragmentation can be damaging to the effectiveness of ODA, particularly in recipient countries with low institutional capacity, as it may increase the transaction costs of aid. Fragmentation is manifested in different forms, such as the number of donor-funded activities and the financial size of aid commitments and the dispersion of small-scale free-standing technical assistance as a modality (instrument) of aid delivery.

Aid Fragmentation and Associated Costs

The number of donor-funded activities is large – particularly in the social sectors – and the average financial size of aid interventions/activities is small. The average size of donor funded activities in developing countries is about USD 1.5 million and total number of interventions/activities has reached almost 60,000. The social sectors (including health and education) account for 48 per cent of all activities

[28] IDA. 2007. *Cit*.

recorded in the Creditor Reporting System for 2004. This average size of donor activity does not change substantially across sectors or across income groups except for infrastructure projects (about 3 times the average size), general budget support (13 times) and debt relief (16 times).

Figure 3: Number of DAC donors and major multilateral agencies per country (Gross disbursements of CPA, 2005)[29]



Source: OECD

Fragmentation is reinforced by the fact that the majority of aid activities allocated by modality is for free standing technical assistance. As noted in the 2006 Global Monitoring Report, "technical cooperation is often criticized as being excessively costly because of the high cost of international experts, as exacerbating the problem of brain drain by training the best and brightest but not being able to retain them, and as being too fragmented and uncoordinated."

Fragmentation seems to be higher the lower the institutional capacity of recipient countries. Where implementation capacity is very low, donors tend to finance a large number of small activities in a relatively reduced number of sectors. As government capacity becomes higher, donors seem more willing to support larger projects in more sub-sectors and to increase the overall amount of aid resources to the country, as measured by commitments per capita.

Transaction costs of ODA affect both donors and recipients. In fact, "donors, recipients and independent observers all agree that the system is too complicated and imposes high transaction costs on all parties". Such costs reflect a rising number of aid channels and donor activities/interventions; progressive earmarking of funding through multilateral and bilateral channels; and widespread use of uncoordinated technical assistance. While there is ample anecdotal evidence of the increase of transaction costs caused by aid fragmentation and donor proliferation, they have not been systematically quantified.

From the recipient countries' perspective, transaction costs are directly and indirectly associated with the administrative burden placed on them. Some authors distinguish between direct and indirect transaction costs. Direct costs refer to the diversion of scarce resources in recipient countries – notably the time and attention of politicians and government officials – away from domestic priorities in order to attend to demands associated with managing aid-related activities. Such costs are especially relevant in situations

[29] OECD. 2007. "Towards better division of labour: concentration and fragmentation of aid, Global Forum on Development - Policy Workshop on the Challenges of Scaling Up at Country Level: Predictable Aid Linked to Results" http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_37824719_39712354_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

where aid is subdivided into many small “packets” with their own managerial and reporting requirements. Indirect costs result from the impact of aid proliferation and fragmentation on the incentive systems in recipient countries’ government bureaucracies. An example of such indirect costs is when donor-financed project implementation units lead to “brain drain” from line ministries where managerial skills are in short supply.

4. ODA to agriculture: some key issues

Agriculture seems is back on the development aid agenda, seen as a key to both spurring growth and getting large numbers of people out of poverty, and as a key route to meeting the MDGs. Indeed, in developing countries, agriculture contributes to the bulk of employment and remains an important part of GDP and export earnings.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture accounts for 20 per cent of GDP and employs 67 per cent of total labour force. Furthermore, 75 per cent of the world's poor work and live in rural areas and, according to estimates, 60 per cent will continue to do so by 2025.[30]
Notwithstanding this, ODA to the sector decreased in real terms by nearly half between 1980 and 2005, despite an increase of 250 per cent in total ODA commitments over the same period. The share of ODA to agriculture fell from about 17 per cent in the early 1980s to a low of 3 per cent in 2005.
In sub-Saharan Africa the reduction in agricultural aid was less dramatic, but still sizeable, with a decline of about 35 per cent over the period.[31] Multilateral aid to the sector declined in both relative and absolute terms, and increasingly focused on agricultural policy and institutional reform, rather than direct support.[32]

[30] ODI, Donor Policy Narratives: What Role for Agriculture?, Future Agricultures Briefing Paper, 2006 http://www.odi.org.uk/plag/resources/briefingpapers/facbriefing_donorpolicynarratives.pdf

[31] The DAC statistical definition of aid to agriculture includes agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes, agricultural land and water resources, agricultural development and supply of inputs, crops and livestock production, agricultural services, agricultural education, training and research as well as institution capacity building and advice. Forestry and fishing are identified as separate sectors but are often shown as part of aid to agriculture in statistical presentations. The definition excludes rural development (classified as multi-sector aid) and developmental food aid (a sub-category of general programme assistance). The sector code identifies "the specific area of the recipient's economic or social structure which the transfer is intended to foster". In DAC reporting (as well as in most donors' internal reporting systems), each activity can be assigned only one sector code. For activities cutting across several sectors, either a multi-sector code or the code corresponding to the largest component of the activity is used. It follows that:
DAC statistics on aid to agriculture only relate to activities which have agriculture as their main purpose and fail to capture aid to agriculture delivered within multi-sector programmes.
Aid to agriculture through NGOs may also be excluded, since this is not always sector coded in as much detail as project and programme aid. In recent years, more than a quarter of the contributions have been classified as agricultural policy or agricultural development (e.g. agricultural sector programmes, integrated agricultural development projects) and one fifth as agricultural water resources development (i.e. irrigation programmes). Within DAC countries' bilateral aid, particularly in the case of Japan, provision of agricultural inputs (mainly fertilizers but also seeds, machinery and equipment) is another important sub-sector.
Activities promoting the use of new technologies in agriculture fall under the training/research category, which represents 6 per cent of total aid to agriculture. This figure may be an understatement, for several reasons. First, research programmes are generally smaller than other projects in the sector. Secondly, research components are likely to be incorporated in crop production or general agricultural development projects but their share in the total cannot be separately identified. Finally, some donors' technical co-operation data are incomplete. Arriving at an accurate figure for donors' ODA to increasing productivity in agriculture would require an in-depth analysis of several agricultural sub-sectors.
Source: OECD, Aid to Agriculture 2001,
http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/policycoherence/index.php/iiis/development_cooperation/trends_in_agricultural_aid

[32] IFAD, Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness, 2007, http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/92/e/EB-2007-92-R-9-Rev-1.pdf

Figure 4: Aid to Agriculture from DAC Countries and Multilaterals



The role of aid in public spending in agriculture

According to a 2007 joint DFID/World Bank study, donors continue to provide the majority of agriculture development spending. This can be problematic given the erratic nature of donor funding commitments and low levels of actual disbursements.[33]

Many of the problems associated with donor-financed projects include: lack of sustainability; poor monitoring and evaluation; overlapping interests; diversion of public officials' time away from core government activities, and; lack of effective coordination with other projects or the national development agenda. A common problem related to the high share of donor funding in the sector is the failure to provide sufficient recurrent funds to ensure that development spending is adequately serviced in terms of operations and maintenance.[34] This imbalance between the capital and recurrent budgets arises from a combination of: a dual budget system (separate ministries handle the recurrent and capital sides of the budget); political processes which favour capital investments, and; an expectation that much of recurrent funding needs will be met locally through in-kind contributions and user fees. Under-funding of the recurrent budget has become an increasing problem over recent years and has resulted in capital investments being made without due regard to the recurrent costs required to properly service these investments. This problem is illustrated by the irrigation sub-sector, which accounts for a significant share of sector spending but suffers low utilisation rates (around 60 per cent) largely due to insufficient funds being allocated to operations and maintenance.

[33] Oxford Policy Management, Review of Public spending in agriculture. A joint DFID/World Bank study, 2007, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/pfma07/OPMReview.pdf
The study points out that In Ghana, donors provide nearly all the development budget, including in agriculture. Here, analysis of donor loans and grants shows that agriculture is receiving a declining share of total donor funds available, with increased donor funding going to rural feeder roads and broad-based rural development programmes. By contrast, in Uganda domestic commitments to agriculture are increasing and are now close to parity with levels of donor funding – although it is possible that some of this domestic funding includes donor funds provided through sector programme support.

[34] According to the study, there is evidence of this in the country case-studies (although to some extent this problem is mitigated by the inclusion of funds within project budgets to meet certain recurrent costs). Oxford Policy Management, Review, cit.

The DFID/World Bank study suggest that the contraction of funding to agriculture over the past two decades is derived from a combination of factors. These include:

- An ideological shift away from state intervention in the economy – structural adjustment, the liberalisation of agricultural parastatals, the adoption of market-led approaches and the reduction in subsidies has reduced the 'space' for public sector expenditures on agriculture;
- An increasing focus by the state (and donors) upon spending to the social sectors (primarily health and education), largely driven through Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and MDG processes;
- Changes in aid modalities involving a trend towards budget support (the budget process does not favour agriculture – see below), and an increasing perception that the problems in agriculture can be addressed through other sectors (transport, infrastructure etc);

Where donors continue to engage in agriculture, donor funds typically account for a major share of the sector budget, but disbursement rates can be below expectations and unpredictable.[35]

How is ODA to agriculture used?

Donor commitments of aid for the agricultural production sector roughly doubled from USD 4 billion in the mid-2000s to just over USDS 8 billion in 2010, but it was still just 5 per cent of total ODA commitments.
The deployment of development assistance to agriculture has changed during the past 20 years. Several trends can be noted:

- Assistance for direct support to agriculture, notably for agricultural inputs, agricultural services (including finance), agricultural education and research, has fallen. This partly reflects changing perceptions of the role of the public sector in the provision of agricultural inputs and services. Very few development agencies (with the notable exception of Japan) now provide agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, chemicals, seeds and machinery.
- Assistance through area-based or crop-focused projects has declined while support to agricultural policy and administration has risen.

Assistance to land resources, forestry and fisheries has increased in relative terms.

- Assistance to irrigation and drainage projects has remained fairly constant, but there is reduced enthusiasm for large-scale engineering projects and greater sensitivity to environmental and social aspects.
- Support to bilateral research has fallen but it has been replaced to some extent by support channelled multilaterally, such as through the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

There have been similar changes in multilateral assistance. A comparison of World Bank lending approvals (which provide a good proxy for the multilaterals as a whole) between 1979–81 and 1999–2001, showed the largest declines have occurred in relation to two areas: a) perennial crops and agro-industry, where there has been a shift away from supporting parastatal enterprises (a major focus of development efforts in the 1960s and 970s); and b) agricultural credit, where the focus has moved away from commodity targeted credit in favour of broadening and deepening general financial services.[36]

The efficacy of ODA to agriculture

In terms of efficacy, assistance to agriculture has had mixed results. However little evidence exists regarding the relative advantages and effectiveness of different aid instruments or mechanisms for agricultural development. The nature and focus of assistance to agriculture has changed substantially over the past 40 years, making definitive judgements of impact difficult. Yet past assessments can help to identify lessons for improving the quality of future assistance to agriculture. Agriculture strategies have typically evolved in tandem with changing dominant development paradigms, shifting from:

- 1960s to early 1980s: the Green Revolution, whereby new technologies supported by the provision of government support services led to agricultural expansion and intensification in high productivity areas of Asia;

[35] Oxford Policy Management, Review, cit
[36] DFID, Official Development Assistance to Agriculture, 2004
http://www.isgmard.org.vn/Information%20Service/Report/General/oda%20in%20agriculture-DFID.pdf

- mid-1980s to mid-1990s: Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP), which focused on direct assistance to the rural poor, but were considered unsuccessful due to poor multisectoral co-ordination and overambitious design;

- 1980s to present: Concerns about the performance of IRDPs contributed to a shift towards adjustment lending, market-led approaches and a withdrawal of the state;

- mid-1990s to present: Sector wide Approaches (SWAPS) and support to Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) as a basis for donors to contribute more coherently to budgets and processes designed by governments.

-SWAPS – whilst there have been some positive experiences (e.g. Uganda, Zambia), the fundamental characteristics of the agricultural sector make developing and implementing a SWAP more difficult than in more homogenous sectors, such as health or education.

-PRSPs – agriculture has been weakly reflected in PRSPs to date, partly due to the focus on increasing social sector spending.

In sum, if the target of reducing extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 is to be achieved, the share of ODA going to agriculture will need to better reflect agriculture's importance in generating livelihoods for the majority of the rural poor. In terms of the efficacy of changing aid mechanisms, the particular characteristics of the agricultural sector suggests that it will be particularly important to achieve a balance of different aid instruments (i.e. project, SWAP and budgetary support), and to assess their utility on a country-by-country basis.[37]

Main trends in ODA to agriculture and rural development

The decline in aid (and public expenditure) in agriculture is seen by many as a paradoxical neglect of a sector central to economic growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, in much of the developing world, and particularly in SSA, agriculture is still an important part of the economy and a significant proportion of the poor depend directly on it. Low levels of public and private investment in the sector have been matched by low levels of agricultural output and productivity, with a few localised exceptions in sub- sectors like floriculture and horticulture. Insufficient public agricultural investment may be an important constraint to the development of the sector.

On the whole there is still insufficient understanding of the composition and quality of agricultural spending and of how these might be (or not) affected by the decline in funding. Poor data, together with limited knowledge of unit costs, make it hard to assess scale, relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of public agricultural spending accurately.[38]

A key question is why is this happening and with what impact? Certainly the decline in aid and spending in the agricultural sector appears inconsistent with the proclaimed importance of agriculture to development. Various explanations have been presented to explain the decline, including:

- Increased competition for resources from other sectors. Some argue that the MDGs and PRSs have moved attention towards the social sectors and increasingly towards 'rural services', at a potential cost to the productive sectors.

- The acknowledgement that many of the obstacles to agricultural growth need to be addressed outside the agricultural sector through such areas as energy and transport policy, infrastructure investment, tax regimes, international trade regulation;

- Changing aid modalities and the view amongst some that the new aid modalities not only focus less on agriculture but also work less well in agriculture because of complexity and the risks involved;

- Loss of confidence in the sector due to poor performance of investments in agriculture. Several aid evaluations in the sector have produced unfavourable results with regards to cost effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

In a highly critical review paper of fifty years of international aid to African agriculture, Eicher argues that "after fifty years of experience, most donors remain confused about how to package, coordinate and

[37] DFID, Official Development Assistance to agriculture, cit.

[38] ODI Funding agriculture: not "how much?" but "what for?", Opinion n. 86, 2007, http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/opinions/86_funding_agriculture_oct07.pdf

deliver aid to accelerate agricultural and rural development in Africa".[39] He notes how different, and at times, conflicting traditions within the agricultural policy community have culminated in an overload of policy prescriptions and approaches that have not only often not worked but, in some cases, are in danger of being repeated. Eicher argues that in recent years the pendulum of professional opinion about what makes for effective aid has swung widely, including in agriculture. The result is that agriculture almost disappears in the transition from project to programme aid in the new aid framework.

Stagnating spend in agriculture has been noted as a major problem for growth and reaching the MDGs, but inadequate funding is not the only (nor necessarily the most binding) constraint facing agriculture and rural development (A&RD). Poor management of available resources and the quality of expenditure is a major challenge. Much of the reason for lagging investment, particularly in A&RD in Africa, is the history of poor returns which are in turn linked to weak institutions. Longstanding problems of weak public financial management, combined with the size of off-budget flows in the sector are also a major concern. Rapid changes in the global context means new challenges for the spending and service delivery functions of A&RD institutions, which arguably may not require more public funding, but better and higher quality funding through partnerships with the private sector.[40]

Table 4: Agricultural ODA by Subsector, 2009

Purpose code		Number of activities	Disbursements (million dollars)
31110	Agricultural policy, and administrative management	2441	1029
31120	Agricultural development	2668	1042
31130	Agricultural land resources	527	211
31140	Agricultural water resources	882	810
31150	Agricultural inputs	175	105
31161	Food crop production	859	559
31162	Industrial crops/export crops	289	78
31163	Livestock	556	136
31164	Agrarian reform	57	15
31165	Agricultural alternative development	227	484
31166	Agricultural extension	569	232
31181	Agricultural education/training	586	106
31182	Agricultural research	703	152
31191	Agricultural services	418	222
31192	Plant/post-harvest protection and pest control	106	14
31193	Agricultural financial services	212	82
31194	Agricultural co-operatives	395	49
31195	Livestock/veterinary services	198	83
32161	Agro-industries	505	105

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

[39] See Eicher, Flashback: Fifty Years of Donor Aid to African Agriculture. Paper presented at InWEnt, IFPRI, NEPAD, CTA conference - Successes in African Agriculture, 2003, http://www.ifpri.org/events/conferences/2003/120103/papers/paper16.pdf

[40] GDPRD, Sector-Wide Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development: A Desk Review of Experience, Issues and Challenges, 2006, http://www.donorplatform.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,343/

5. The Role of Non-DAC Donors in ACP Agriculture

Agriculture is a growing sector for south-south and triangular cooperation in the ACP[41]; increasingly, the private sector within developing and emerging countries is looking to get involved in cooperation related to ACP agrifood through programmes backed by either national development agencies and banks, or as part of their corporate social responsibility or sustainability programmes. Although individual donors may be motivated by personal goals or outcomes from cooperation initiatives, there is often a platform of characteristics which can create further incentives for non-DAC donors to get involved in agricultural cooperation with developing countries. These can range from sharing a common or similar culture, language, geography, climate, economy and or history. Furthermore, the entrenched nature of cooperation which can arise between DAC members and developing countries which can act as a barrier to innovation and new forms of collaboration, may not be present with non-DAC donors. In this respect, non-DAC donors have been able to rely on indigenous characteristics such as often having a significant population of smallholder farmers in rural areas who could be relied upon to demonstrate successful approaches to farmers from other developing countries.

An assessment of the scale of non-DAC donor aid in 2011 put it at between USD 11 billion and USD 41.7 billion, or 8 and 31 per cent of global gross ODA during that period,[42] although more recent assessments predicted that by 2025 this figure could rise to USD 50 billion.[43] These figures represent a growth of non-DAC ODA in the context of a trend towards decreasing ODA amongst OECD and traditional donors, although a like for like comparison of aid contributions by DAC and non-DAC donors is challenged by the fact that non-DAC contributions are largely not classified and reported in the same manner as those of the DAC countries. The opacity of non-DAC assistance is a frequently discussed issue, but according to the East Asia Foundation (2014: p.5), rather than representing an intentional unwillingness to share information on ODA by non-DAC donors, the factors that contribute to this phenomenon may be complexities in the aid systems of developing or emerging country donors, and capacity constraints which present a challenge in reporting what and how much support is given to which countries or programmes, as well as issues with domestic accountability and reluctance to publicly disclose information about the partner countries.

In terms of contributions or assistance in the agricultural sector, the scale of non-DAC interventions in this area, including those of China and India remain comparatively small when viewed against those of OECD countries.[44] Africa is a key beneficiary region for agricultural assistance, although there is a long history of interventions by non-DAC donors within their respective regions, and China in particular has made inroads into agriculture in other ACP regions, particularly the Pacific (East Asia Foundation, 2014: p.17), whereas the Caribbean has benefited from support from regional powerhouses such as Mexico and Brazil, which along with Argentina, accounted for 70 per cent of cooperation in the Latin American and Caribbean region, usually in the context of assistance for the productive sector as a whole (including mining and the processing industries).[45] Colombia, Cuba and Chile made up 25 per cent of South-South cooperation in this region. Countries within Latin American are also increasingly adopting triangular cooperation with regional organisations to assist their Caribbean neighbours, such as the support by Mexico of the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA) project on economical farming development in the Caribbean, to which Mexico has assisted by providing greenhouses to St Lucia. Agriculture has in fact been the most prevalent sector to receive support through Mexico's bilateral and triangular South-South cooperation, making up 22 per cent of bilateral cooperation and 41 per cent of triangular cooperation, with education and health interventions being significantly fewer. This is in contrast

[41] Nsoudou, C. 2014. "Promoting Effective Development Cooperation: The role of the ACP Group in South-South and Triangular Cooperation", Working Paper, Brussels, May 2014
[42] Walz, J. and Ramachandran, V. 2011. "Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance." CGD Working Paper 273.
[43] The Asia Foundation. 2014. "The Changing Aid Landscape in East Asia: The Rise of Non-DAC Providers"
[44] Future Agricultures. 2014. "New Paradigms of Agricultural Development Cooperation in Africa: Lessons from Brazil and China". Policy Brief 063. February 2014.
[45] Xalma, C. 2013. "The New Boom in South-South Cooperation: The Experience of Ibero-America". Journal of Integration and Trade. Nº36 // Volume 17 // January-June 2013. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB-INTAL).

to DAC ODA which over the past twenty years has moved away from productive sectors in favour of social issues and interventions.

A notable example of the new form of regional South-South cooperation, also involving the private sector is the Mexico-Haiti Partnership which was established in November 2010. This initiative involves the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs along with a number of agencies of big companies (*Fomento Social Banamex*, the Bancomer Foundation, the Televisa Foundation, the Chrysler Foundation, the Aztec Foundation, and *Unidos por Ellos*) to provide financial assistance and develop projects together with the Haitian government covering infrastructure, health and agriculture sectors. The *De Campesino a Campesino* project is a landmark initiative within this partnership, which "sought to share successful production and marketing experiences with organizations of Mexican peasant producers, and Haitian peasants and promoters…aimed at comprehensive long-term, local, sustainable development". Food security in rural Haitian communities was also supported through the partnership by way of food production project incubation and microcredits.[46]

De Campesino a Campesino – Mexico, Haiti, private sector and civil society cooperation in agriculture and food security

The first phase of the project (2011) was of short duration, consisting essentially of Haitian peasants visiting rural communities in several Mexican states to give them knowledge of experiences of organic agriculture, and the development of productive capacities and access to information on how to incubate social enterprises and negotiate public resources, and so manage microcredit and savings cooperatives in an organized fashion. According to information from its organizers, the project to May 2012 enabled the incorporation of new technologies in the field for cultivation and irrigation, using elements drawn from the local environment, the planting of prickly pear cacti and their Haitian-style culinary preparation, and the establishment of experimental kitchen gardens.

This initiative captures a number of trademarks of South-South cooperation, which involve adaptation of programmes to local contexts and circumstances, the use of technical, knowledge and experience sharing, along with the involvement of the private sector. Despite its role as a contributing partner in a number of South-South or Triangular Cooperation programmes, the private sector is largely overlooked when it comes to receiving assistance under non-DAC initiatives, which broadly target public sector institutions or projects.[47]

Within the ACP group itself, Cuba stands out in terms of the level of South-South cooperation it engages in, including for agriculture and fisheries – Kwak (2014: p. 46) notes that Cuba has signed agreements on with Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea as well as Guyana, Haiti, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, St Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda and the Dominican Republic under the Special Food Security Program of the World Food Organization which has seen Cuban agriculture and fisheries experts and technicians participate in knowledge-sharing activities with these countries. Additionally, a number of southern non-DAC donors have also initiated triangular cooperation programmes with traditional DAC donors in support of African agriculture, such as the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP), launched in 2000, with the aim of supporting Portuguese speaking Africa countries through the implementation of joint training projects in the fields of agriculture and health (Kwak, 2014: p.48).

5.1. Intra-ACP South-South and Triangular Cooperation in Agriculture

[46] Pérez, JB. 2013. "Civil Society Organizations and Inclusive Partnerships for South-South Cooperation in Latin America". Journal of Integration and Trade. Nº36 // Volume 17 // January-June 2013. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB-INTAL).

[47] Kindornay S., Heidrich P. and Blundell, M. 2013. "South-South Development Cooperation in Latin America: What Role for the Private Sector?". Journal of Integration and Trade. Nº36 // Volume 17 // January-June 2013. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB-INTAL).

Cooperation between ACP countries in the field of agriculture is an area that has historically received limited attention, but there is growing support to assist intra-ACP knowledge sharing through triangular and South-South cooperation. This is especially relevant in the case of the Pacific and Caribbean ACP regions where the countries share similar characteristics in terms of their size, vulnerabilities to exogenous shocks and climate change, and economic profiles. Furthermore, this form of cooperation capitalises on regional capacities and collective experiences, as opposed to bilateral, country to country cooperation which, given the size and other capacity constraints of individual islands in the Pacific or Caribbean, would make inter-regional cooperation a more suitable form of engagement.

An example of the cooperation between the Caribbean and Pacific on agriculture and food security is the 'South–South Cooperation Between Pacific and Caribbean SIDS (Small Island Developing States) on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management' project, which was funded and supported by UNDP. The basis if this project was a recognition of the common challenges and vulnerabilities to climate related risks that the Caribbean and Pacific islands both face, which have disastrous consequences in terms of impacting infrastructure and productive capacities, as well as loss of human life. Following an expression of interest by the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the CARICOM Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) to engage with the Pacific region, the UNDP, through its Pacific Centre and Caribbean Risk Management Initiative programme, acted as a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchanges in successful adaptations that individual countries in these regions had developed to counter climate related risks and then with the support of other agencies, developed a system of knowledge sharing, resource mobilisation and training. The funding of the project was largely provided by the UNDP-Japan Partnership Fund, with the Japan International Cooperation Agency being engaged at various times throughout the duration of the project to provide technical support to Pacific countries. The success of the project also saw additional funding and support coming in from other donors including the World Meteorological Organization, the ACP-EU and the Canadian International Development Agency.

Five primary areas of knowledge exchange were identified as having been the most successful, the first of these being the establishment of agro-meteorology systems. Agro-meteorology experts from Cuba were responsible for leading the agro-meteorology training, which was attended by 29 Pacific technical staff from the agricultural departments and meteorology developments of each country, and developing a guidance note on 'logical steps for assessment of climate change impacts on agriculture'. Whereas prior impact analysis by Australia and New Zealand for Pacific island countries concerning agro-meteorology has previously failed to build capacity, the Cuban approach differed by teaching their Pacific counterparts the basic skills needed to carry out agro-meteorological assessments and also focused on crops that were essential to the Pacific island diets and food security such as cassava, taro and breadfruit. Overall, the project has also proved sustainable beyond the role played by the UNDP as South-South cooperation between the two regions on agriculture and climate change have continued, with some of the initiatives developed under the project being spun off and submitted to the Global Environment Facility for grants or other support. [48]

5.2. BRICS engagement in Africa

The expanding footprint of BRICS[49] countries in Africa, especially over the last 15 years, has remained a subject of intense public interest in academic, development and diplomatic circles. The superlative 'win-win' has been widely used to distinguish cooperation with BRICS countries. They set themselves apart from the West, whose aid has been criticised for being *conditional;* coming with *strings attached.*

The core principles espoused in the discourse on engagement with BRICS countries include equal partnerships, mutual (or win-win) benefits, solidarity, non-conditionality, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as well as sharing of experiences.

[48] Bernard K. and He L. 2013. "Small Islands, Vast Oceans and Shared Challenges: Linking Caribbean and Pacific SIDS through South–South and Triangular Cooperation". JICA Research Institute, Kato H. and Honda S. 'Tackling Global Challenges through Triangular Cooperation: Achieving Sustainable Development and Eradicating Poverty through the Green Economy', October 2013, Chapter 9.
[49] BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

With these principles being a departure from the OECD aid effectiveness guidelines that have been agreed to among the Development Assistance Committee group of countries, the uneasiness among the traditional donors that the BRICS engagement could undermine their efforts is understandable.
Gabas and Tang (2014) note that North-South cooperation and its conditionalities are tainted by colonial legacy. Developing countries have by and large embraced the BRICS approach as it represents a departure from the donor hegemony that is associated with tied aid. The BRICS countries do not carry any colonial guilt and feel that they have a stronger affinity with developing countries that have been major recipients of development assistance from the West; Brazil, India and South Africa in particular were former colonies and bring in their experiences as major recipients of Western aid.
Carmody (2013), however, cautions that win-win globalisation and the South-South cooperation mantra disguises skewed power relations between the BRICS and developing countries, noting the high likelihood for the provider of the development assistance to act as a 'Big Brother'. Mhandara et al. (2013) reiterate this, and posit that much as some relations between aid-dependent countries and Western donors have often been described as cases of neo-colonialism, cooperation with BRICS countries can also easily degenerate into that status.

5.2.1. China accounts for over half of the BRICS' cooperation

China accounts for over half of the BRICS' cooperation (Muggah and Thompson, 2015) and is considered both less malleable, and a bigger threat for its unique political system, governance and economic might.

In terms of providing finance, China has been Africa's most prominent emerging partner, and Chinese enterprises have increased their trade and investment relations with African counterparts by a factor of more than ten over the past decade. The growing trade and investment relations are often supported by grants or as part of the country's "Going Global" strategy, which provides soft loans and other assistance to foreign investment projects by Chinese enterprises, particular in emerging markets.[50] Chinese banks have been increasingly involved in providing financial services to facilitate trade and investment projects in Africa; the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), established in 2007 by the China Development Bank (CDB), has a USD 5 billion equity investment fund to assist Chinese companies in expanding into Africa.
China's phenomenal growth offers an opportunity to boost development in African countries. It has become Africa's single largest trade partner - total trade between Africa and China grew from USD 10 billion in 2000 to approximately USD 210 billion in 2013, and Chinese FDI into Africa more than doubled between 2009 and 2012, from USD 9 billion to USD 21 billion respectively.[51] The European Union and the United States nevertheless remain the largest trade and investment partners for many African economies. Additionally, OECD DAC members provide USD 36 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa (and finance the bulk of the additional USD 18 billion from multilateral donors). By comparison, China's aid to Africa (defined according to DAC criteria) is about USD 1.5-2 billion. [52]

The expansion of Chinese commercial activities in Africa has led to a shift in public policy from a narrow focus on trade and investment relations, to a broad range of development issues such as supporting Africa's attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, addressing climate change, food security[53], energy security and epidemic diseases. Since Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006, a new cooperation model in agricultural sector has been implemented with the Agricultural demonstration centres in 25 countries in sub Saharan Africa. This model is based on three pillars: aid, business and trade. China itself is going through a "development cooperation" learning curve; it is likely both that its

[50] Schiere R., Ndikumana L., and Walkenhorst P. (Eds.) 2011. "China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development?" AFDB.
[51] Tjønneland E.N. 2015. "African development: what role do the rising powers play?" Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report – January 2015
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflowsite/storage/original/application/fa8aeed1b5911794106c324bf90d0e09.pdf
[52] By its own accounts in 2014, Chinese ODA to Africa for the period 2012-2014 was approximately USD 7.5 billion. Tjønneland E.N. 2015. *Cit*.
[53] Gabas J.J., Tang X., 2014. "Chinese Agricultural cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa. Challenges preconceptions", available http://www.cirad.fr/en/content/search?SubTreeArray%5B%5D=2&SearchText=perspective+n%C2%B026

aid coordination with traditional donors will increase, and that it will pay closer attention to the implications of its assistance for governance and the environment[54]. It is important for Africa to engage China in its consideration of development cooperation policies, to ensure that China's aid is effective and complements, rather than competes with, aid from traditional donors. Interregional competition between Africa and other commodity exporting regions with which China has extensive economic ties e.g. Latin America, emphasizes the importance of strengthening competitiveness and addressing structural challenges in Africa.

Table 5: Sectoral Distribution of China's Concessional Loans, 1996-2009

(Current RMB¥ Million)

Sector	Total	% of Total
Economic Infrastructure	44.87	61.0
Energy and resources development	6.55	9.0
Industry	11.84	16.0
Agriculture	3.16	4.0
Public Facilities	2.35	3.0
Others	4.78	7.0
TOTAL	73.55	

Source: China State Council (2011)

Source: *Broich, T. and Szirmai, A. 2014. China's Economic Embrace of Africa -An International Comparative Perspective. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance / UNU-MERIT. Maastricht University. 2014*

[54] Gabas J.J., Ribier V. 2015. « Synthèse des quatre études de cas sur les interventions de la Chine dans le secteur agricole en Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopie, Sénégal et Togo. , CTA, CIRAD, septembre 2015

Table 6: Sectoral Distribution of Total Bilateral Net ODA Disbursement in Africa, 1973-2012

(Shares in %)

	1967	1973	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2012
Social Infrastructure		14.1	7.6	10.7	10.0	26.3	29.8	24.7	36.1
Education		3.9	3.0	4.3	2.5	5.1	9.1	7.3	8.3
Health		2.0	1.8	2.5	2.4	4.8	5.4	*3.1*	*5.9*
Population & Reproductive Health		0.5	0.3	1.0	1.2	2.2	5.2	*2.8*	*6.8*
Government & Civil Society		6.1	0.3	2.2	2.8	9.7	6.6	*8.2*	*12.9*
Other Social Infrastructure & Services		1.7	2.3	0.7	1.1	4.5	3.5	*3.2*	*2.2*
Physical Infrastructure		30.6	29.7	22.0	23.9	21.1	10.6	8.3	18.6
Transport & Storage		12.5	14.8	6.6	7.9	5.6	3.3	3.9	7.2
Communications		4.5	4.4	2.2	2.4	1.4	1.3		
Energy		8.9	6.7	5.3	6.9	6.1	1.6	2.2	5.3
Water Supply & Sanitation		4.7	3.8	7.9	6.7	8.0	4.4	2.2	6.1
Production Sectors		12.4	17.4	20.4	18.2	12.0	15.5	3.9	8.0
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing		6.7	11.9	12.9	12.2	8.6	7.1	2.8	6.6
Industry, Mining, Construction		2.7	5.0	6.1	3.4	1.0	2.5	0.5	0.9
Trade Policies & Regulations		0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.5
Tourism		1.5	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0		
Banking & Financial Services		1.4	0.3	1.3	2.1	1.3	0.9	1.7	2.3
Business & Other Services		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	4.8		
Multi-Sector		1.0	5.1	3.1	7.2	8.1	9.2	5.2	6.3
Commodity Aid / General Progr. Assist.		32.4	26.7	33.8	22.5	13.0	13.5	5.3	5.9
Debt Relief		1.0	10.7	4.9	16.5	14.1	13.2	36.9	8.2
Humanitarian Aid		0.7	1.1	3.8	1.1	4.6	7.1	11.9	12.4
Unspecified		7.8	1.6	1.3	0.6	0.8	1.1	2.2	2.3
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Our sectoral classification slightly deviates from the sectoral classification by the OECD. We have reallocated "Water Supply & Sanitation" from social infrastructure to physical infrasstructure, but also "Banking & Financial Services" and "Business & Other Services" from social infrastructure to the productive sector. Data in italics are estimates by the authors. For the years 2005 and 2012 a detailed sectoral breakdown of social infrastructure does not exist according to our knowledge (with education being the exception). The fraction of social infrastructure <u>except</u> education can be calculated for those two years. This remaining fraction is then divided among the other subcategories of "Social Infrastructure" by applying the same weight for those sub-categories as in Table 7. The shares of several sub-categories are reported together for the years 2005 and 2012, for example Trade & Tourism.
Source: OECD (2003) - International Development Statistics. CD-Rom; Authors' own calculations based on OECD/DAC Database

Source: *Broich, T. and Szirmai, A. 2014. China's Economic Embrace of Africa -An International Comparative Perspective. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance / UNU-MERIT. Maastricht University. 2014*

Table 7: China's ODA-like Commitments to Africa by Sector (ESTIMATES), 2000-2011

(In Current and Constant Million US$)

Sector	Volume (constant)	Volume (current)	% (constant)	% (current)
Social Infrastructure	7,335.0	6,215.6	**44.89**	**45.21**
Education	2,191.3	1,396.3	13.41	10.16
Health	1,178.2	1,114.8	7.21	8.11
Population Policies / Programmes and Reproductive Health	1,023.0	1,100.4	6.26	8.00
Government and Civil Society	2,023.3	1,630.5	12.38	11.86
Other Social infrastructure and services	909.0	962.6	5.56	7.00
Support to (Non-)Government Organizations	10.2	11.0	0.06	0.08
Economic Infrastructure	1,183.7	1,069.7	**7.24**	**7.78**
Transport and Storage	643.3	691.9	3.94	5.03
Communications	184.4	113.2	1.13	0.82
Energy Generation and Supply	356.0	264.6	2.18	1.92
Water Supply and Sanitation	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Production	920.6	590.2	**5.63**	**4.29**
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	811.6	489.0	4.97	3.56
Industry, mining and construction	48.1	48.1	0.29	0.35
Trade and tourism	34.6	37.2	0.21	0.27
Banking and Financial Services	16.9	10.2	0.10	0.07
Business and Other Services	9.3	5.6	0.06	0.04
Multisector	1,133.2	1,133.2	**6.94**	**8.24**
Commodity Aid/General Programme Assistance	154.6	116.9	**0.95**	**0.85**
General Budget Support	146.9	109.1	0.90	0.79
Non-food commodity assistance	7.8	7.8	0.05	0.06
Debt Relief	2,724.9	1,613.0	**16.68**	**11.73**
Humanitarian Aid	793.3	572.0	**4.86**	**4.16**
Food aid	153.2	95.1	**0.94**	**0.69**
Unallocated/Unspecified	1,948.0	2,350.0	**11.92**	**17.09**
TOTAL	16,338.8	13,747.9	**100.00**	**100.00**

Source: Own calculations based on dataset by Strange et al. (2013) using a Media Based Data Collection Approach

Source: *Broich, T. and Szirmai, A. 2014. China's Economic Embrace of Africa -An International Comparative Perspective. Maastricht Graduate School of Governance / UNU-MERIT. Maastricht University. 2014*

5.2.2. Brazil involvement with Africa - comparative advantages and strategies [55]

Brazil is bringing in new perspectives on the benefits of modern agricultural development, and its accommodation of social movements in development cooperation has been applauded.[56]

Brazil is presenting itself as a development partner (rather than a business partner) familiar with the development challenges of the South, including all of Africa, due to similar ecosystems. It is sharing its successes in biomedical and health research, agriculture and food security with Africa as entry points for furthering its foreign policy and as a means of gaining economic presence and securing markets for its manufactured goods.[57] Through the innovative research work of the *Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária* (EMBRAPA), Brazil has become a foremost authority in tropical agriculture. With its

[55] Zimbabwe-Brazil cooperation through the More Food Africa programme Langton Mukwereza
[56] Cabral and Oxley 2013
[57] Muggah and Thompson 2015; Patriota and Prerri 2012; Stolte 2012.

machinery and agricultural research developed under similar conditions to Africa, the country presents its equipment as 'tropicalized technology'. The dominant narrative presented by the country is that its cooperation is a horizontal relationship between countries sharing common problems and development challenges.[58]
A major feature of Brazilian cooperation, distinguishing it from traditional donors and China, is that much less disbursement of cash is involved; De Bruyn (2014) presents Brazil as a source of 'inspiration' and China as a source of 'financial resources'. Agriculture has the largest portfolio in Brazil's cooperation programmes with Africa, and the major thrust of its technical cooperation is characterised contributing towards global development and food security through sharing knowledge and successful experiences (Farani and Arraes 2012).

Among the BRICS countries, Brazil made the greatest strides in poverty reduction and increasing food security (Oxfam 2010). With food insecurity rampant due to low agricultural production and a large proportion of the continent's inhabitants deriving their livelihood from agriculture, most African countries view Brazil's successful transformation of family farms as a model that can be adapted by them. Two prominent examples stand out in Brazil's successful response to food insecurity: the Zero Hunger programme and the *Programa Mais Alimento* which formed the basis of the *Programa Mais Alimento África* that also includes a credit line facility for African smallholder farmers to gain access to agricultural inputs, notably machinery and new technologies.

The strategy that Brazil has chosen, to promote itself as a world power of note, does not infringe on the interests of traditional donors, and indeed a significant portion of Brazilian cooperation is delivered under trilateral frameworks with traditional donors and/or international organizations to build synergies and maximize its limited funds.[59]

5.3. China's Cooperation for Agriculture in Sub-Sahara Africa and the Pacific

China's cooperation with Africa in the field of agriculture has been a component of broader Africa-Chinese cooperation since the 1960's, although historically the trend was more towards infrastructure projects, with technical exchanges and capacity building in agriculture featuring more prominently in recent decades. The scale of Chinese ODA for African agriculture is difficult to measure, for the same reasons related to the overall challenge in measuring South-South cooperation. However, recent figures show that China invested USD 82 million into African agriculture in 2012, up from USD 30 million in 2009, and that SSA exported USD 5 billion worth of food and agricultural products to China in 2012.[60] Up to 13 per cent of Chinese ODA in 2009 went to Latin America and the Caribbean, with agriculture, infrastructure projects and public works being the primary recipient sectors; nevertheless, Africa receiving the lion's share of Chinese ODA at 45 per cent.[61]

Various programmes and initiatives have been launched by a number of Chinese state and parastatal agencies with a view to supporting African agriculture, but before enumerating these, it is important to put into context the rationale behind China's engagement on agriculture in Africa.

Lessons to be learnt from Chinese Agricultural Revolution

China's recent history, in terms of its agrarian to industrial revolution, which saw the country go from a situation of food insecurity, reliance on subsistence agriculture towards being an economically progressive nation which now has the capacity to feed 20 per cent of the global population on only ten per

[58] Cabral and Oxley 2013; Stolte 2012
[59] Farani and Arraes 2012; Cabral and Weinstock 2010
[60] Tugendhat, H. 2014. "New Paradigms of Agricultural Development Cooperation in Africa: Lessons from Brazil and China". Future Agricutlures, Policy Brief 63
[61] Kwak, JS. 2013. "The Rising Importance of South-South Cooperation in Asia-LAC Economic Relations". Journal of Integration and Trade. Nº36 // Volume 17 // January-June 2013. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB-INTAL).

cent of the world's arable land. Subsequently, China has positioned itself as being a natural champion for assisting Africa to "fast-track" the modernisation of its agricultural sector.[62]

Unlike the approach of DAC donors to agriculture in ACP countries, China has engaged less directly with the private sector and local agribusiness enterprises, preferring instead to work with the government agencies of the partner countries, which reflects the Chinese development assistance paradigm which is more demand driven and responds to the specific priorities or desired projects of governments. According to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than providing development 'aid', China "provides direct government-to-government resources, including for agricultural development".[63] One of the criticisms that has been levied at this modality of assistance provision is that the smallholder farmer, who was a central part of China's agrarian transformation, and who is likewise key for Africa's economic transformation, is overlooked in Chinese agricultural assistance projects or initiatives, as these are more likely to focus on larger public programmes or large agribusiness projects.

China-Africa Agriculture Projects

A landmark cooperation project that has been launched by China within Africa to target the agricultural sector has been the establishment of Agricultural Technology and Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) in various African countries, of which 14 had been built by 2013, out of 20 that the Chinese government had committed to construct since 2006.[64] ATDCs are research and demonstration centres that aimed at sharing the successful approaches that have been taken in China, into Africa through technology, knowledge sharing and exchanges. These Centres are operated by parastatal companies or agencies on behalf of the government and have increasingly use Chinese technologies as a means of disseminating the successful practices of China's agricultural. They are established under the aegis of Africa-China partnership in the sense that the African government will be directly involved in their establishment and the Chinese government provides the finance, staff and other resources.[65]

- **Mozambique**: China has been active in supporting development initiatives in Mozambique, where it has provided over USD 100 million in concessional loans through the China Exim Bank which have targeted rehabilitation and develop agricultural infrastructure. Additionally, the ATDC in Umbeluzi, which is managed by the Hubei Lainfeng Agricultural Development Corporation (HLDC), has facilitated training on technological and other practices for agriculture. For example, Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique Corporation, a subsidiary of the HLDC, has a programme to develop 3000ha of the Xai-Xai irrigation scheme being carried out in the Gaza province of Mozambique.
- **Ghana**: cooperation between China and Ghana dates from the period of Ghana's independence, and although the bulk of Chinese activities have centred around infrastructure, energy, communications, agriculture is growing in prominence with China implementing a rice irrigation project in Nobewam; a fertiliser plant has been built by a Chinese-Ghanaian company in Amasaman, Accra together with an agrochemicals subsidiary by a Kumasi based Chinese industrial group, which demonstrate the growing role of China's private sector in African agriculture.
- **Zimbabwe**: Zimbabwe has also benefited from an ATDC, and staff of Zimbabwe's Ministry of Agriculture have been funded to carry out study tours. The country has received a substantial amount of finance through China's Exim Bank – a yet to be ratified USD 334 million facility was set up to allow Zimbabwe to procure tractors and carry out a mechanisation programme; this is in addition to the USD 14 million that Zimbabwe has received for food aid in from China. The cotton and tobacco industries have also received substantial attention from Chinese state and private enterprises. For example, a Chinese contractor, Tianze Tobacco, held 12 per cent of all tobacco

[62] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. "Can China and Brazil help Africa feed itself?" Future Agricultures Consortium CAADP Policy Brief 12
[63] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit.*
[64] Chichava S. and Fingermann NN. 2015. "Chinese and Brazilian agricultural models in Mozambique. The case of the Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre and of the Brazilian ProALIMENTOS programme" Future Agricultures, Working Paper 112
[65] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit.*

marketed in 2011, although the practices of these contractors have also come under criticism – in the cotton sector, Sino Zimbabwe Cotton Holdings was criticised for failing to invest in local production and best practices.[66]

Triangular cooperation between China and agricultural agencies to deliver assistance to African countries has also been reported, although the scale of Chinese triangular cooperation overall is still much lower than that of Brazil and Chile for example. One notable project China has participated in is with IFAD, which itself already has a programme specifically dedicated to the subject of South-South and Triangular cooperation in the area of agriculture. [67]

Collaboration between IFAD China on SSTC

Since 2011, a jointly funded IFAD-China grant programme has organized six workshops bringing together participants from Africa, Asia and Latin America. These workshops encouraged capacity-building and knowledge-sharing for senior developing country officials, and exchange programmes were organized for development professionals at operational and district levels. In one such exchange, participants from San Juan Province in Argentina were able to gain in-depth knowledge of innovations on groundwater management and drip irrigation from the IFAD-supported Modular Rural Development Programme in Xinjiang, China. A return visit, coordinated by IFAD, led Chinese officials to look at Argentina's experiences in pro-poor cooperative development. A workshop held in Maputo in Mozambique from 4 to 8 August 2014 focused on three important policy reforms in China, which resulted in unblocking agricultural development. These reforms were in agricultural policy and impacts, agribusiness and mechanization, and research and development. By putting in place incentives for smallholder farmers and increasing their participation in the agricultural sector through improved property rights, both grain production and farmer income rose. The workshop produced a number of conclusions on how Africa could better take advantage of SSTC, including through the review of investment policies, identification of financial needs and allocation of budget to SSTC cooperation; encouragement of private-sector involvement in the agricultural sector through enabling policies; and improved research extension linkage to enable technological transfer to be speeded up.

China- Pacific Agricultural Cooperation

The mining and sectors have been the primary beneficiaries of Chinese investment into the Pacific region, although overall trade between the two has been growing in recent years, standing at USD 4.5 billion in 2012. Economic cooperation has constituted a key area where China is looking to increase engagement with Pacific island countries (PICs) – this is evidenced by the decision by China in 2014 to remove tariffs for 97 per cent of imports from Pacific LDCs. Increasing aid and development cooperation has also been on the agenda, and China announced in the same year that over a five year period it would provide 2000 scholarships and 5000 study and training opportunities.

In terms of ODA to the Pacific region, the most substantive volumes have come from the OECD DAC donors – particularly the region's primary donors, Australia and the United States – who transfer around USD 2 billion annually in ODA to PICs;[68] according to the UNDP (2014) the Pacific region only received 4 per cent of China's allocated aid in 2009, growing to 4.2 per cent for the period 2010-2012. Nevertheless, progress is rapidly being made, and Patroba (2014) reports that China is now the Pacific regions' third largest donor, having made significant increases in dollar terms over the last decade.[69]

[66] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit*.
[67] IFAD. 2014. "South-South and triangular cooperation: changing lives through partnership"
[68] Smith G., Carter G., Xiaojing M., Tararia A., Tupou E. and Weitao X. 2014. "The Development Needs of Pacific Island Countries". Australia Aid and United Nations Development Programme
[69] Patroba, H. 2014. "China in the Pacific islands: What are the lessons for Africa?" Centre for Chinese Studies.

Figure 5: Total Aid Commitments of China and major donors to PICS 2010-2012 (2012, USD million)

Source: *UNDP 2014*

As was has been the case in other regions, China has focused mainly on infrastructure projects and public works in terms of the aid it provides to PICs, with the bulk of the financing coming from concessional loans through Chinese public finance agencies and banks. The high-level China-Pacific Island Countries Economic and Development Forum, of which there have been two, one in 2006 and a second in 2012, have seen announcements made of almost USD 1.5 billion worth of concessional loans made to the PICs largely to support infrastructure projects in the Pacific region. Training and capacity building has also seen a boost in recent periods.[70]

- **Samoa:**[71] Cooperation between China and Samoa has been taking place since the independence of the former country, with a small amount of grant aid (USD 0.8 million in 2009) being allocated for agricultural assistance.

Due to the extensive role already played in the Pacific by Australia, there has been a growing interest to develop avenues for triangular cooperation between China, Australia and PICs, capitalising on the extensive experience China has already developed in other regions on training programmes, knowledge and information exchanges and other technical support programmes. Whereas the bulk of China's development cooperation has been carried out bilaterally, there have been a number of triangular cooperation projects in conjunction with development agencies and international organisations, such as the UNDP, the World Bank and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, working in various countries in Africa, Latin America and the Pacific. Of late, China has also been working with the development agencies of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the UK and the US, though these have largely focused on social development issues such as education, health and sanitation. In a joint report for Australia Aid and the UNDP, Smith et al (2014) identified a number of cooperation opportunities between Australia and China on agriculture in the Pacific, building on existing programmes carried out by China, notably the Farm Demonstration Programs:

Agriculture cooperation between China, Australia and Pacific Islands[72]

The potential for niche agricultural exports to China, and a broad range of products to Australia and New Zealand is significant. For Samoa and Tonga, where NCDs [non-communicable diseases] are a serious problem, the promotion of horticulture by Chinese technical teams also brings significant health benefits. Extension and dissemination remains a barrier, largely due to language barriers and the limited capacity

[70] United Nations Development Programme. 2014. "Chinese Development Aid in Pacific Island Countries and Opportunities for Cooperation". South-South Cooperation Issue Brief Dec 2014

[71] Dornan, M. and Brant, P. 2014. "Chinese Assistance in the Pacific: Agency, Effectiveness and the Role of Pacific Island Governments". Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University

[72] Smith G. et al. 2014. *Cit.*

of local agricultural extension services. This is a natural site for cooperation with local ministries of agriculture, working alongside experts from ACIAR or similar organizations, or volunteers. The involvement of another development partner could help ensure that the training reaches the right people, and does not exacerbate inequality. Cooperation could be expanded to cover all three countries [including Papua New Guinea], as the set up of the agricultural teams is similar in all countries.

Other programmes with Pacific island countries have also seen numerous South-South cooperation support activities on agriculture, again, focusing on training and exchanges, but also demonstrate one of the key challenges that partners face in terms of the lack of long-term assistance and the Chinese orientation towards projects that are either limited in geographic scope within a country, or are not integrated into a broader joint development plan between China and its partner.[73]

Table 8: Technological cooperation between China and Fiji

Year	Cooperation content
1986	China sent three agricultural experts to Fiji to teach rice cultivation technology
1992	China sent two agricultural experts to teach vegetable cultivation technology
2004	Agreement on plant quarantine
2006	Help Fiji with health proganmmes
2011	Agreement on the Chinese government provided aid to the Fiji government
2012	Agreement on China help Fiji in its development of the Rice Industry Project in Vanua Levu

Source: *Patroba, H. (2014)*

Lessons learnt by Agricultural engagement between China, Africa and the Pacific

Chinese support of Africa agriculture has been rather narrow in scope throughout the period in which China has developed a clearer strategy or mechanisms of involvement in this sector. Although flagship project such as the ATDCs have brought attention to South-South cooperation between African countries and China, there have been numerous setbacks as well as lessons to be learnt from failures of cooperation projects along the way.

One of the biggest challenges from the perspective of African and Pacific agribusiness in terms of Chinese cooperation has been the government to government approach whereby by and large, China does not encourage direct investment into smallholder farming in the country and works instead on bigger projects with the backing of the African and Pacific governments where the initiatives are to be carried out. This means that often the beneficiaries of the projects are not smallholder farmers directly, but rather staff or agencies that have the backing of the partner government, who may not always disseminate the knowledge and skills to the grassroots. Another issue is the lack of funding for the implementation phase of the project, whereby cooperation schemes that involve knowledge exchange between Chinese and agricultural practitioners are carried out with a view for local stakeholders to learn about Chinese technologies but adequate finance is not available for these technologies to either be tested locally or implemented in the local farming systems. This challenge is one that also speaks to the general issue of limitations in smallholder agricultural investments in Sub-Sahara Africa and the PICs, particularly for the acquisition of new technologies and improved agricultural practices.

Finance from Chinese facilities such as the Chinese Exim Bank have been forthcoming in Africa, including for the agricultural sector, but as the experience of Zimbabwe has demonstrated, the lending provided under this channel has attracted criticism for exacerbating African countries' debt to China and for having onerous repayment obligations. The issue of indebtedness, the onerous repayment terms or lack of transparency surrounding Chinese financing for development or infrastructure projects has also been an issue in the Pacific region, where the proliferation of concessional loans from China has led to concerns that the future generations in Pacific island countries will be burdened by loan repayments to

[73] Smith G. et al. 2014. *Cit.*; Guixia, L. 2014. "China's development aid to Fiji: motive and method" The Research Centre of the Pacific Island Countries, Liaocheng University, Shandong Province, China.

China, and in the case of Papua New Guinea, there have even been government restrictions on the amount of Chinese loans that the country can accept.[74]

In the Pacific, while Chinese policymakers are interested in adopting some aspects of the OECD-DAC approach to development, it is clear that they wish to maintain a different brand of aid, built on its own identity as a developing country.

Bilateral relationships still dominate the aid system, even on the part of traditional donors. While much of the engagement with multilateral organizations – primarily the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the Pacific – reflects reduced technical capacity and appetite for risk on the part of traditional donors, rather than a strong commitment to multilateralism, engagement with one delivery partner reduces the burden on the recipient country's point of contact in a given sector. The primacy of mutual benefit is not limited to emerging donors. For example, Australia's recently announced aid policy will focus on ways to drive economic growth in developing nations and create pathways out of poverty.
Under the new policy, new aid investments will consider ways to engage the private sector and promote private sector growth. Aid for trade investments will be increased to 20 per cent of the aid budget by 2020.

Papua New Guinea, as the largest recipient of Australian and Chinese development assistance in the Pacific (and the second largest recipient of DFAT overall, after Indonesia), could not be overlooked. It is the site of the largest single investment by a Chinese company in the Pacific, the USD 1.6 billion Ramu nickel/cobalt mine in Madang province. It is also the site of a proposed PNG-China-Australia development cooperation project on malaria control.
Samoa was a logical choice, as it is a stable country with strong institutions, where China has long enjoyed a strong presence as a provider of development assistance. A large number of the infrastructure projects arising from China's 2006 Concessional Loan Facility were secured by Samoa, including several government buildings, and the national hospital, partly contributing to a high level of external debt. China is the fourth most significant donor, behind Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and China has had a permanent diplomatic presence in Samoa for longer than Australia (only New Zealand established an embassy before them).
Tonga, along with Fiji, is one country where China's development assistance in the South Pacific has generated some controversy, largely due to concerns on the part of traditional donors (ADB in particular) about the level of external debt Tonga was accruing as a result of "soft loans" for infrastructure projects it had obtained through the 2006 Facility, with total public debt at 43 per cent of GDP, 90 per cent of that held by external creditors.4 Surprisingly, the World Bank and the IMF revised Tonga's risk of debt distress from high to moderate, despite weak economic performance and their own report finding that the "debt service burden is expected to rise sharply from FY 2013/14, substantially draining the government's cash balance."5 While there is little prospect of the two China Eximbank loans being forgiven (they were recently rescheduled), the debt-servicing issue gives incentive for cooperation to strengthen Tonga's economy.[75]

Specific characteristics of Chinese development assistance in the Pacific
As far as cooperating with China is concerned, it should be kept in mind that there are two distinct modalities of Chinese development assistance that present different avenues for coordination and cooperation.

i) Grants, interest-free loans, and aid-in-kind
Policy statements and research papers indicate that China intends to shift a greater proportion of its development assistance budget towards grants.18 Spending in this sector tends to be relatively predictable: support for medical teams, agricultural experts, scholarships and small- to medium-scale infrastructure spending (usually in the education and health sectors). The research team has focused on

[74] Patroba, H. 2014.
[75] The Development Needs of Pacific Island Countries. Report prepared by: Graeme Smith, George Carter, Mao Xiaojing, Almah Tararia, Elisi Tupou and Xu Weitao. Austarlia Aid. UNDP.
ttp://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/Pacific%20Research%20Report%208%20Oct%20ZC.pdf

the potential for technical collaboration in these sectors. Smaller grants are also disbursed at the discretion of the ambassador, with those in the Pacific provided with around USD 50,000 for their three-year term. Because of China's responsiveness to immediate needs of partner governments, grants can also go towards one-off purchases, often as aid-in-kind, such as the MA60 aircraft provided to the Kingdom of Tonga in response to a government-to-government request in 2013.

ii) Concessional loans

Future concessional loans to the Pacific are difficult to predict, as China is traditionally responsive to requests from host governments, whose needs shift over time, and are also influenced by the electoral cycle. One consequence of the emphasis on concessional loans is that China's impact as a donor in each country can vary greatly, according to the loan cycle.

As an example, China has been the leading donor in Samoa, in terms of the amount of funds disbursed, from 2010 to 2013. While under the Paris Principles, grants are the preferred mode of aid delivery, it should not be assumed that concessional loans lead to worse development outcomes than grants, particularly for infrastructure projects. Where a project is funded by a concessional loan, the recipient country often has greater leverage in the application of building standards, procurement processes, and the use of local labour.

The research team focused on identifying large infrastructure projects that hold potential for multi-partner development cooperation. In Papua New Guinea, there are excellent prospects for cooperation on the Highlands Highway. Port and foreshore redevelopment in Apia, Samoa, is seeing interest from a number of development partners, including New Zealand.

Tonga's success in securing the 2019 South Pacific Games shifts the focus of its infrastructure aspirations, while critical needs remain in the areas of water, electricity and transport. As much as trends can be discerned from China's 2011 and 2014 White Papers on Foreign Aid, given they are comparing a 59-year period that saw vast political and economic shifts with the three-year period 2010-2012, there appears to be a move away from interest free loans (29.9 to 8.1 per cent), with grants (41.4 to 36.2 per cent) and concessional loans (28.7 to 55.7 per cent) making up the bulk of the aid program.

Unlike in Africa, China's aid presence in the Pacific is relatively new, with most of its aid in the region starting in the early 1980s. Though its development assistance has increased in recent years, it remains a smaller partner in the Pacific compared with major donors such as Australia and New Zealand and multilateral donors such as the UN and Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank, ADB, IMF). China can learn about valuable practices, experiences, and lessons learned from other donors and improve its aid effectiveness to contribute more to the host countries' social and economic development.

China's aid in the Pacific, however, is dispersed across various fields, and does not focus on specific priorities. Most of China's aid is designed and delivered on a project basis, and does not always demonstrate coherence across projects in the same sector. In addition to developing mid-term country strategy plans, China could also consider other donors' and multilateral organizations' experiences in designing sector-wide programs to improve coherence and aid effectiveness.

China tends to work mostly with the central government of the partner country in learning about their development needs. Provincial and local-level governments, local NGOs and communities are seldom involved. This is partly due to the limited number of staff in both the Chinese central government and local embassies. This may lead to the problem that sometimes the needs of the host government may not effectively match the needs of the local people. Some provincial governments and agencies noted that their needs had been neglected, and that training opportunities seldom reached the local governments. To date, China has not cooperated with local NGOs. If China could establish partnerships with more local stakeholders, it could improve their understanding the development needs of partner countries, and design projects to better meet the needs of the local people, not just those of the central government.

Agriculture. The potential for niche agricultural exports to China, and a broad range of products to Australia and New Zealand is significant. For Samoa and Tonga, where NCDs are a serious problem, the promotion of horticulture by Chinese technical teams also brings significant health benefits. Extension and dissemination remains a barrier, largely due to language barriers and the limited capacity of local

agricultural extension services. This is a natural site for cooperation with local ministries of agriculture, working alongside experts from ACIAR or similar organizations, or volunteers. The involvement of another development partner could help ensure that the training reaches the right people, and does not exacerbate inequality.84 Cooperation could be expanded to cover all three countries, as the set up of the agricultural teams is similar in all countries.[76]

5.4. Brazil's Agricultural Cooperation with Sub-Sahara Africa

Agriculture and food security have been much more central to Brazil's cooperation with Africa, and Brazil has continued to broaden the scope of its engagement with African countries on agriculture beyond the traditional Lusophone partners such as Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde. What is more unique about Brazil's agricultural activities in Africa, by comparison with other countries engaged in South-South Cooperation, is its willingness to involve the private sector on both sides, whether they are agribusinesses or manufactures of inputs and other agriculture related technologies. Additionally, Brazil has worked with partners on the policy front, particularly on smallholder agriculture and food security related measures. The agenda of Brazilian agricultural cooperation is broadly based on Brazil's own experiences or models to promote family farming, agribusiness and food security, in economic, social and environmental conditions that Brazil considers somewhat comparable to those of some of its African partners.[77]

Figure 6: Brazilian investments in international development projects, share per continent, 2009–10



Source: ABC 2009, 2011.
Note: The total amounts, in 2009 and 2010, respectively, were for Asia and the Middle East US$2,012,682 and US$2,082,674; for Latin America US$7,575,235 and US$14,437,785; and for Africa US$9,608,816.64 and US$22,049,368.

Source: *World Bank/ IPEA (2011)*

Since 2010, when Brazil became a net aid provider, the approach it has taken in its relationship with Southern partners has been distinct from that which it experienced as an aid recipient, looking at partnerships amongst equals and recognising the shared experiences and legacies that it has with Africa. According to figures from the World Bank and IPEA (2011) "Brazil has the second-largest African population in the world, in absolute numbers, behind only Nigeria. The 2010 national census shows that 50.7 per cent of the Brazilian population is of African descent (of a total 2010 population of about 191 million)." In light of this, it is unsurprising that Africa has been singled out as the priority partner for Brazil in terms of development cooperation and related projects – 57 per cent of Brazilian investments in international development projects went to Africa in 2010, up from 50 per cent in 2009, significantly higher than what Brazil invested into Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Within the context of this extensive investment and cooperation drive, agriculture is a significant target sector,

[76] The Development Needs of Pacific Island Countries. Report prepared by: Graeme Smith, George Carter, Mao Xiaojing, Almah Tararia, Elisi Tupou and Xu Weitao. Austarlia Aid. UNDP. ttp://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/Pacific%20Research%20Report%208%20Oct%20ZC.pdf
[77] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit.*

making up 19 per cent of Brazil's South-South cooperation project portfolio, ahead of industry, health and education.

Figure 7 : Main areas of Brazil's involvement in South–South cooperative arrangements, 2009



Source: ABC 2009.
Note: Shares are percentages of total project portfolio.

Source: *World Bank/ IPEA (2011)*

Within the context of Brazilian-African cooperation on agriculture, there have been a broad range of projects and engagements, some covering technical cooperation and others on knowledge transfer and exchanges, and missions by Brazilian public and private sector representatives on agriculture or agribusiness to various Sub-Saharan African countries.

Table 9: Brazil Food and Agribusiness Cooperation in Africa: 2000-2011

Angola -Support for National Agricultural Research Center -Support for implementation of the vegetable sanitary service **Benin** -Support for pilot cash-transfer program modeled on *Bolsa Familia* -Cotton 4 Project: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali **Burkina Faso** -Strengthening of the goat and sheep industry **Cameroon** -Support for fish farming **Cape Verde** -Support for horticultural development -Support for National System of School Cafeterias -Institutional strengthening of the Pharmaceutical and Food Regulatory Agency (ARFA) -Support for the sustainable development of cacao farming	**Equatorial Guinea** -Support for family agriculture and manioc farming Strengthening rice farming **Gabon** -Support for breeding of cattle for milk and meat production **Ghana** -Support for development of alternative sources of energy (biofuels) and manioc farming -Support for center for cashew nut development EMBRAPA Center **Mali** -Strengthening horticulture and family agriculture -Experimental station for the production of cotton (Cotton 4 Project) **Mozambique** -Agricultural development, technology platform for agricultural innovation, family agriculture (traditional creole	**Namibia** -Agricultural production of manioc, tropical fruits and vegetables **São Tomé and Príncipe** -Support for family agriculture and rural development -Literacy and school feeding program **Senegal** -National Biodiesel Program and horticultural development -Technical training on cattle management for beef and milk production -Rice Experimental Center (also serves Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Mauritania) **Sierra Leone** -Training on processing of manioc, irrigation and fish farming **Tanzania** -Post-harvest support for cashew nuts and horticulture Development of fish farming **Togo**

Congo -Strengthening of cocoa production -Farming of the African palm (*Dende*) -Modernization of the sugarcane sector	seeds) training in agriculture conservation and technical support for agriculture and cattle raising. Support to research on agriculture. -Nutrition and Food Program: Brazilian-Mozambican cuisine and support for development of national nutritional program Technical support for agriculture and fish farming	-Support for agricultural modernization

Source: *World Bank/ IPEA (2011)* and Authors

Brazilian South-South Cooperation on agriculture in Africa is facilitated by key institutions within the country – the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and EMBRAPA, Brazil's Agricultural Research Corporation. These institutions play an active role on the ground in various Africa countries, where they actively promote and implement cooperation with African counterparts based on the experiences and successes of Brazilians agricultural and food security trajectory, for example the programmes on family and smallholder farming, school nutrition, *Bolsa familial* social security programme and so on.

EMBRAPA, an sizeable agency with a billion dollar budget, is a leading tropical agriculture research institution, which has been working in Africa with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ACB – Agência Brasileira de Cooperação) to disseminate Brazilian research, solutions and technologies to for agriculture, particularly in the tropical regions. In 2006, the first EMBRAPA office as opened in Accra, Ghana, which coordinates all engagements with African partners.

Brazil – Ghana Exchange: *Mais Alimentos Africa*[78]

Brazilian investments in Ghana are comparatively small but focused on the agriculture sector. They reflect the two facets of the Brazilian success story: agribusiness based on large-scale plantations and multinational investments, and smallholder agriculture linked into agribusiness investments.
The More Food International Programme makes provisions for Ghanaian farmers to acquire Brazilian technology – such as tractors – through a US$98m loan to the government of Ghana. The tractors suit holdings of 20-60ha: in Ghana this means quite wealthy farmers or smallholder farmer associations, which are poorly developed. Disbursement of tractors is not new in Ghana, but as fuel costs have increased and cheap tractors have disappeared, farmers are moving towards herbicides to clear land. The More Food Programme back in Brazil builds synergies between: (i) increasing smallholder production, (ii) creating markets for this production through school feeding programmes (social protection), and (iii) creating demands for agricultural technology industries. However, it is not clear how the first two linkages will work in the Ghanaian case, given the different institutional set-up; nor the third linkage, since Brazilian companies are supplying the agricultural machinery. In Brazil, civil society organisations have been important in voicing smallholder demands in policy, but in Ghana farmer movements are weak, and many dominant NGOs support integration of smallholders into agribusiness value chains.

Brazil in Mozambique – ProSavana[79]

ProSavana is one of the most ambitious initiatives in Brazil-Africa development cooperation – expected to cover 14 million hectares along the Nacala corridor in northern Mozambique, transforming it into a highly productive region addressing food security issues. It is inspired by the development experience of the

[78] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit.*
[79] Future Agricultures Consortium. 2013. *Cit.*

Brazilian tropical savannah, the Cerrado, which was supported by a 30-year cooperation programme between Japan and Brazil. ProSavana is being implemented through a 3-way Mozambique-Brazil-Japan partnership.

ProSavana supports both large-scale and smallholder agriculture production systems, drawing on experiences and technologies from Brazil and Japan. The programme involves research, focusing on strengthening IIAM; training and extension, with pilot production projects for small and commercial growers; and an integrated agro-industrial master plan, including infrastructure and markets.

Although ProSavana, the technical cooperation programme, itself does not include private investments, its master plan component is laying the groundwork for Brazilian and Japanese investment in agriculture in the region. The Nacala Fund, launched in 2012, is expected to attract US$2bn in private capital from Brazil and Japan to support large scale production led by Brazilian farmers working with Mozambican farmers. The Fund for ProSavana's Development Initiative between Mozambique and Japan supports different pilot models for integrating smallholder farmers into value chains. Companies are offered reduced interest rates and have to commit to engage smallholders through contract farming.

Seeds for life: Brazil–Africa [80]

In May 2010, farmers from Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa visited Brazil to learn about the annual cycles of planting and harvesting of Creole (native) seeds. The visit was organized under the aegis of the 2007 Technical Cooperation Agreement signed between the government of Brazil and the African Union. The exchange allowed for the development of community seed banks and training in the recovery, multiplication, storage, and use of Creole seeds in family farming, with the goal of strengthening family farming in the three African countries.

The African farmers experienced first-hand family-based agriculture by visiting the Catalã, in the state of Goiás, where they were hosted by the Popular Peasant Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra or MST), formed by more than 1 million family farmers throughout the cerrado region. From peers in the state of Santa Catarina in the south of Brazil, the African farmers learned biodiversity conservation strategies and organic farming techniques. A group of Brazilian farmers visited three African countries to work with local farmers and provide further training on using Creole seeds. The Brazilian government facilitated the purchase of organic seeds for seeds banks.

[80] World Bank and IPEA. 2011.*Cit.*

6. Triangular Cooperation

In tandem with south-south cooperation, triangular cooperation has also emerged as a global vehicle for the provision of development assistance, particularly as emerging economy and developing countries themselves seek opportunities to engage with traditional donors and each other, as partners in the delivery of development cooperation. In a 2012 survey on the state of play triangular cooperation by the OECD, three quarters of respondents – who included providers of development assistance, international organisations and developing countries – were said to be involved in triangular cooperation.[81] Technical cooperation is the most common form of support provided under this framework, and the agricultural sector is among the key areas of intervention. The benefits that triangular cooperation presents vary, but the knowledge or skills sharing and learning potential of working in a triangular partnership are major motivating factors. Additionally, it may be felt that a Southern country may have the best skillsets and technical means to provide another Southern country with assistance in certain domains.

The OECD (2012) defines it as "a partnership where one or more providers of development co-operation support South-South co-operation, joining forces with developing countries to facilitate a sharing of knowledge and experience among all partners involved." The lack of a concrete definition or criteria for triangular cooperation is a major stumbling block to the collection of data on these projects, and the UN (2008) has brought attention to the lack of reliable data on triangular cooperation.[82] This makes these partnerships and projects especially challenging to evaluate, replicate and upscale. Furthermore, the lack of data to substantiate the benefits of triangular cooperation, by comparison with North-South cooperation, has led to increasing scrutiny and some criticism about its impact.[83] Information on financial contributions to triangular cooperation is especially weak.[84]
Ashoff (2010) highlights four risks that may arise from triangular cooperation: (a) lowering quality standards of development support or aid; (b) failure to align the assistance with the beneficiary countries' needs, priorities, and strategies; (c) higher transactions costs to involve three partners as opposed to two; and (d) further fragmentation of the international aid architecture.[85] Additionally, those countries or organisations which themselves are involved in triangular cooperation report coordination of triangular cooperation initiatives as the greatest challenge that they face.

Agricultural triangular cooperation has been facilitated by international organisations such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. It has partnered with the Philippines to provide Pacific island countries with technicians and experts in relation to crops, water management, livestock and fisheries. It also worked with Vietnam on a project that benefited a range of developing countries, including Benin, DRC, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal, for the provision of over 50 experts and 326 technicians who contributed to programme management, monitoring and evaluation systems implementation demonstrating new technologies, and sharing simple Vietnamese tools.

Notable in terms of food and nutrition security is the **Haiti Food Security Project,** funded by Argentina in conjunction with Brazil, Canada, Spain and IFAD, whereby experts were trained in Creole with the aim of teaching Haitian women in the countryside how to strengthen food security.

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[81] OECD. 2012. Triangular Co-operation: What can we learn from a survey of actors involved? http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/OECD%20Triangluar%20Co-operation%20Survey%20Report%20-%20June%202013.pdf

[82] UN Economic and Social Council. 2008. "Trends in South-South and triangular development cooperation" Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum April 2008 http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/south-south_cooperation.pdf

[83] OECD DAC member countries submit annual reports on their ODA to the OECD DAC

[84] The OECD survey on triangular cooperation found that only half of respondents could provide this type of information, either because they included it as part of a larger project or programme, from which it is difficult to disaggregate data, or else the type of assistance or technical support provided may be given as an in-kind contribution.

[85] Guido Ashoff. 2010. "Triangular Cooperation: Opportunities, risks, and conditions for effectiveness", Special Report Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German Development Institute) in World Bank Institute Development Outreach https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6081/deor_12_2_22.pdf?sequence=1

In this regard, the regional dimension of triangular cooperation can be seen as a potential benefit from this form of cooperation over traditional North-South development assistance and it raises the opportunity for DAC donors to collaborate with, or provide assistance to countries or regions that may not have been part of their traditional roster of development partners or beneficiaries.[86] There is increasingly also the opportunity for the private sector to get involved, especially in terms of infrastructure investment and capacity building.

In the Pacific, international organisations have linked with southern partners to deliver agricultural development projects in a number of islands, and the FAO has been extensively involved through its South South Cooperation Programme, known as the Special Programme for Food Security, which it established in 1996 to develop partnerships which largely enable SSC in the area of technical assistance. China has supported the programme by sending experts and technicians to various countries, such as Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria as well as Caribbean and Pacific island countries. More recently, in June 2015, China pledged USD 50 Million to the FAO-China South-South Cooperation Trust Fund to support developing countries in building sustainable food systems and inclusive agricultural value chains.

FAO-China SSC Trust Fund [87]

China was the first country to establish an SSC strategic alliance with FAO through a Letter of Intent signed in May 2006. In 2008, the government of China decided to establish an FAO Trust Fund for USD 30 million in support of the SSC Programme. This SSC Trust Fund was a milestone in the FAO China partnership development which promoted the cooperation to a new level.
In this context, the FAO-China SSC Programme has supported, as of April 2015, 11 SSC country projects and two global projects, in which 287 Chinese experts have been fielded in Mongolia (Phases I and II), Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (Phases I and II), to carry out agricultural technical assistance and extension work.
The FAO-China SSC Programme (Phase I) supported eight capacity development activities in China and one High-Level-Forum on SSC Achievements in Africa held in Nigeria. The FAO-China SSC Programme also provided backstopping to the China-Nigeria SSC project, which was funded by the FAO-Nigeria Unilateral Trust Fund (UTF).
Achievements:
● over 400 practical agricultural technologies were transferred to the host countries;
● there were 268 suitable crops, vegetables and other varieties tested and 174 sets of agricultural machinery tools designed;
● there were 237 pilot demonstrations in more than 80 project sites conducted;
● there were 408 research reports and recommendations prepared and submitted;
● over 1,300 training activities were organized in the field;
● nearly 20,000 local farmers and agricultural technicians received field training, 70 percent of which adopted the technologies;
● more than 65,000 beneficiaries.

But it is not just larger emerging countries such as BRICS which have partnered with FAO to successfully participate in South-South Triangular Cooperation on Agriculture; smaller countries such as the Philippines are also participating and in 2004, it assisted the FAO in Papua New Guinea to implement water control systems and crop intensification, livestock and aquaculture development and post-harvest processing. Five experts and six technicians were dispatched by the Government of the Philippines to Papua New Guinea, which also received financial assistance and agricultural equipment from the Philippines.

[86] OECD. 2009. "Triangular Co-operation: What Do We Know About It?" Factsheet (2009) http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/What%20do%20we%20know%20about%20triangular%20co-operation%20-%20factsheet%202009.pdf
[87] Ndombi, R. and Zhao, Y. "FAO – China South-South Cooperation Programme" http://www.fao.org/3/45c541f6-6065-4ad2-855a-ab4606c9e626/i4700e.pdf

Other fast-growing developing countries which have also succeeded in revolutionising their agricultural sector and productivity has been eager to participate in triangular cooperation, particularly where they have the experience and context that may be more relevant for ACP countries' agriculture, but without the scale of development agencies and domestic institutions to carry out the activities under a bilateral development cooperation framework. An example of this is Vietnam, which has partnered with the FAO in Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal amongst others, sending over 50 experts and 326 technicians, as well as contributing to programme management, field level activities, setting up monitoring and evaluation systems, demonstrating new technologies and disseminating Vietnamese tools.[88]

Triangular cooperation goes beyond facilitating the work of international institutions such as FAO or the World Bank; increasingly, triangular cooperation between a non-DAC and a DAC donor to deliver agricultural development assistance has also been growing, as exemplified in the **Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD)**. This initiative, launched in 2008 by Japan in partnership with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and now features the Africa Rice Center, AfDB, FARA, FAO, IFAD, IRRI, JIRCAS, JICA, NEPAD and WB, USAID, BRAC, and the Gates Foundation as partners. CARD's objective is to support African countries to increase rice production, with its target being to double the yield of rice production in Africa from 14 million tonnes per year to 28 million tonnes per year by 2018. It does this by targeting four different approaches to increasing rice production: the approach by agro-ecology, the value chain approach, the capacity development approach and the South-South Cooperation Approach, which explicitly recognises the "know-how of Asian countries which have long history and experiences in rice cultivation" as a valuable resource which can be used through the CARD programme to support African partners. By 2009, CARD had supported twelve Africa countries to develop National Rice Development Strategies and has 23 CARD member countries in Sub-Sahara Africa.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation in CARD[89]

The overall goal of the Initiative is to contribute to food security and economic growth at household, national and regional levels, through doubling the rice production in Sub-Sahara Africa in ten years from 2008 to 2018 in an environmentally sustainable manner.
The purpose of the initiative is to harmonize efforts of key stakeholders for the development of the ricesector in sub-Saharan African countries, including those of South-South cooperation partners, based on the needs pronounced by the Governments as their national rice development strategies. It should be noted that this initiative is fully in line with the sector-wide regional framework which is the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme.
With regard to resources, this initiative tries to coordinate existing human, material and financial resources, consisting mainly of government, development partners and CAADP, rather than creating a new modality of resource mobilization. The incremental resources for the implementation of this initiative are the operational and activity costs of the CARD Secretariat, which is funded by JICA (about $700,000 per year).
The implementation process started with assisting 23 sub-Saharan African Governments (12 First Group countries and 11 Second Group countries) to formulate their national rice development strategy as a basis for dialogue among key development partners. Then the needs pronounced in each strategy are matched with the comparative advantages of different development partners both public and private. This includes consideration of the way in which the comparative advantages of South-South cooperation fit into the large picture and how the cooperation is facilitated in an effective manner.
The success of the initiative is due principally to the combination of different assets of different partners in various aspects of the initiative. This applies to the designing of the modality of South-South cooperation wherein, inter alia: IFAD funds the studies to design and promote the South-South cooperation aspect;

[88] JICA. 2012. "An Overview of South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation" February 2012, Japan International Cooperation Agency
[89] Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) - JICA, AGRA and NEPAD http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/Expo/solutions/2008_to_2012/2012326173290.Coalition%20for%20African%20Rice%20Development%20(CARD)-2010.pdf

AfricaRice, FARA and the International Rice Research Institute undertake the regional resource needs based on their rich human/institutional networks; JICA catalyses bilateral South-South cooperation through its technical assistance activities to Africa; and FAO proposes an institutional framework to efficiently facilitate exchanges of South-South human resources. Such a combination, revolving around the shared vision of the needs of the African countries, is a main engine for realizing efficient and systematic South-South cooperation.

7. The way forward

The economic independence that African economies are gaining from globalisation can be sustained if countries draw up their own development policies and co-ordinate them at regional and continentals level to better negotiate with their traditional and emerging partners.

In most development discourse, private companies are considered to give the greatest impetus to globalisation. The increased footprints of BRICS countries have been described as globalisation of state power, as their governments (rather than private companies) have been taking the initiative. The Brazil-Zimbabwe cooperation in agricultural mechanisation aptly illustrates this point, as negotiations have been spearheaded by governments, and the programme will be implemented by both the state and private sectors of the two countries.[90]

A key feature distinguishing the BRICS countries' cooperation from that of traditional donors is that aid, trade and investment are often provided in combination, with the boundaries between each of them often blurred. Engagement with the BRICS is often of a longer term with a bias towards visible 'hard' sectors (e.g. infrastructure and capital equipment). Developing countries have welcomed the aid thrust, as capital and infrastructure no longer feature prominently in the aid portfolio of traditional donors who are increasingly focusing on 'soft' interventions (education, health, capacity building and governance) instead.

It is instrumental for African countries to seek leverage in order to turn this burgeoning opportunity for collaboration and support from Southern partners into sustainable, broad based development, which targets poverty, unemployment, food security and structural transformation, these being key challenges the continent struggles with. Additionally, the issue of governance – both in the public and private sector – should not be overlooked, and therefore it is incumbent on both African countries *and* traditional partners to remain on board with development cooperation frameworks and policies that call for transparency, ownership and accountability in all development cooperation and related forms of collaboration.
In this regard, African countries and other developing countries benefiting from south-south and triangular cooperation, can look enhance the long term potential of this new dynamic in global relations by:

- **Linking regional integration** to so south-south and triangular cooperation, in order for the policies and networks driving regional trade to be able to benefit from additional investment, technical and other capacity building support and to also avoid the duplication of activities.
- Strengthening **monitoring, evaluation and feedback loops** to establish a clear picture of the types and scale of engagement, to promote transparency and to learn from past experiences.
- Supporting **private sector south-south and triangular networks**, in order to empower businesses, entrepreneurs and investors to establish mechanisms and terms of engagement that can catalyse their access relevant information, skills transfers, new markets, finance etc.

[90] Mukwereza, L. 2015. "Zimbabwe-Brazil cooperation through the More Food Africa programme. Future Agricultures". 2015.http://www.future-agricultures.org/publications/research-and-analysis/working-papers/1946-zimbabwe-brazil-cooperation-through-the-more-food-africa-programme/file

ANNEX

Glossary

Aid
The words “aid” and “assistance” refer to flows which qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid (OA).

Aid Untying
The ending of the practice of most donors to insist that aid is spent on goods and services from the donor country in favour of giving unrestricted access to those who can compete best on price, quality and service.

Amortization
Repayments of principal on a loan. Does not include interest payments.

Associated financing
The combination of Official Development Assistance, whether grants or Loans, with any other funding to form finance packages. Associated Financing packages are subject to the same criteria of concessionality, developmental relevance and recipient country eligibility as Tied Aid Credits (q.v.).

Commitment
A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multilateral organizations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the year reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments and (ii) expected disbursements in the following year.

Concessionality Level
A measure of the “softness” of a credit reflecting the benefit to the borrower compared to a loan at market rate. (cf. Grant Element). Technically, it is calculated as the difference between the nominal value of a Tied Aid Credit (q.v.) and the present value of the debt service as of the date of disbursement, calculated at a discount rate applicable to the currency of the transaction and expressed as a percentage of the nominal value.

Concessional Resources
Development assistance with a grant element normally greater than 35 per cent.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is a forum for consultation among 22 donor countries and the European Commission, on how to increase the level and effectiveness of aid flows to all aid recipient countries. The member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and United States.

Export credits
Export credit loans for the purpose of trade and which are not represented by a negotiable instrument. They may be extended by the official or the private sector. If extended by the private sector, they may be supported by official guarantees.

Financial Aid

Financial Aid in the wider sense is defined as a grant or loan of money which is the subject of a formal agreement with the recipient government or institution. In practice it is all bilateral aid except technical co-operation and administrative costs.

Foreign direct investment (FDI)
Foreign investment that establishes a lasting interest in or effective management control over an enterprise. Foreign direct investment can include buying shares of an enterprise in another country, reinvesting earnings of a foreign- owned enterprise in the country where it is located, and parent firms extending loans to their foreign affiliates. International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines consider an investment to be a foreign direct investment if it accounts for at least 10 percent of the foreign firm's voting stock of shares. However, many countries set a higher threshold because 10 percent is often not enough to establish effective management control of a company or demonstrate an investor's lasting interest.

Foreign investment
Investment in an enterprise that operates outside the investor's country.

Grant element
Reflects the financial terms of a commitment: interest rate, maturity (q.v.) and grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan, in the form of the present value of an interest rate below the market rate over the life of a loan. Conventionally the market rate is taken as 10 per cent in DAC statistics. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 percent; it is 100 per cent for a grant; and it lies between these two limits for a soft loan. If the face value of a loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the grant equivalent of that loan. (cf. concessionality level) (Note: the grant element concept is not applied to the market-based lending operations of the multilateral development banks).

Grant like flow
A transaction in which the donor country retains formal title to repayment but has expressed its intention in the commitment to hold the proceeds of repayment in the borrowing country.

Grant
Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.

Gross domestic investment rate
All the outlays made to replace and increase a country's physical capital, plus changes in inventories of goods, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Gross domestic investment, along with foreign direct investment, is critical for economic growth and economic development.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - The total value of goods and services produced within a country.

Gross National Income (GNI)
Previously known as Gross National Product, Gross National Income comprises the total value of goods and services produced within a country (i.e. its Gross Domestic Product), together with its income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less similar payments made to other countries.

Loans (also credits)
Transfers for which repayment is required. Only loans with maturities of over one year are included in DAC statistics. Data on net loans include deductions for repayments of principal (but not payment of interest) on earlier loans. This means that when a loan has been fully repaid, its effect on total net ODA over the life of the loan is zero.

Multilateral Aid
Aid channelled through international bodies for use in or on behalf of aid recipient countries.

Multilateral operational agencies
In DAC statistics, these international institutions with governmental membership which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies, an regional groupings (e.g. certain European Union and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC Member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency.

Net official assistance
The sum of grants and concessional loans from donor country governments to recipient countries, minus any repayment of loan principal during the period of the loans.

Net private flows
Privately financed capital flows that enter a country on market terms, minus such flows that leave the country. An example of a net private flow is net portfolio investment- the value of stocks and bonds bought by foreign investors minus the value of stocks and bonds sold by them. See also portfolio investment.

Official Aid (OA)
Flows which meet conditions of eligibility for inclusion in official development assistance (q.v.), other than the fact that the recipients are on Part II of the DAC List of Aid Recipients. References to Official Development Assistance in this publication can be taken, mutatis mutandis, to apply to official aid.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. For the treatment of the forgiveness of Loans originally extended for military purposes, see Notes on Definitions and Measurement below. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.

Official development finance (ODF)
Used in measuring the inflow of resources to recipient countries: includes (a) bilateral ODA, (b) grants and concessional and non concessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and (c) Other Official Flows for development purposes (including refinancing Loans) which have too low a Grant Element to qualify as ODA.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
A group of industrial countries promoting growth and high employment among its members, fostering international trade and contributing to global economic development.

Other official flows (OOF)
Transactions by the official sector with countries on the List of Aid Recipients which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as Official Development Assistance or Official Aid, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a Grant Element of less than 25 per cent.

Partially untied aid
Official Development Assistance (or Official Aid) for which the associated goods and services must be procured in the donor country or among a restricted group of other countries, which must however include substantially all developing countries (substantially all CEEC/NIS countries in the case of Official Aid). Partially untied aid is subject to the same disciplines as Tied Aid Credits and Associated Financing.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

The Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and triangular cooperation defines South-South cooperation (SSC) to be "a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation". The definitions for South-South and triangular cooperation are based on the Nairobi Outcome Document ii, negotiated in the UN High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation and adopted by the UN General
Assembly in December 2009.

Technical Co-operation/Technical Assistance

Includes both (a) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and (b) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries, (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme expenditures, and not separately identified as technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows.

Acronyms

AADRI	Asia-Africa Development Research Institute
AfDB	African Development Bank
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
A&RD	Agriculture and Rural Development
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CARD	Coalition for African Rice Department
CPA	Country Programmable Aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (of OECD-DAC)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAFC	Department of Aid to Foreign Countries
DAG	Donor Assistance Group
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DSA	Debt Sustainability Analysis
Embrapa	Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária/ Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum for China-Africa Cooperation
G77	Group of 77 Developing countries
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GPRS	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative
IDA	International Development Association
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategy group
JDC	Joint Development Commission
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JV	Joint Venture
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PASDP	Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development Programme
PICs	Pacific Island Countries
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSDC	South-South Development Cooperation
SSTC	South-South Triangular Cooperation
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TDC	Triangular Development Cooperation
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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